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Rapidly innovating industries are not behaving the way theory expects. 
Conventional industrial organization theory predicts that, when parties in a 
supply chain have to make transaction-specific investments, the risk of oppor- 
tunism will drive them away from contracts and toward vertical integration. 
Despite the conventional theory, however, contemporary practice is moving in 
the other direction. Instead of vertical integration, toe observe vertical disin- 
tegration in a significant number of industries, as producers recognize that 
they cannot themselves maintain cutting-edge technology in every field re- 
quired for the success of their products. In doing this, the parties are develop- 
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ing forms of contracting beyond the reach of contract theory models. In this 
Article, toe connect the emerging contract practice to theory, learning from 
what has happened in the real world to frame a theoretical explanation of 
this cross-organizational innovation and to reconceptualize the boundaries of 
the firm accordingly. We argue that the vertical disintegration of the supply 
chain in many industries is mediated neither by fully specified technical in- 
terfaces that allow suppliers to produce a modular piece of the ultimate prod- 
uct, nor by entirely implicit relational contracts supported only by norms of 
reciprocity and the expectation of future dealings. Rather, we suggest that 
the change in the boundary of the firm has given rise to a new form of con- 
tracting between firms - what we call "contracting for innovation. 
" This 
pattern braids explicit and implicit contracting to support iterative collabora- 
tive innovation by raising switching costs. These costs, represented by the 
parties 
' 
parallel transaction-specific investments in knowledge about their 
collaborators' capacities, deter opportunism under circumstances where ex- 
plicit contracting, renegotiation, and the anticipation of future dealings 
cannot. 
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Introduction 
Rapidly innovating industries are not behaving the way theory ex- 
pects. Conventional industrial organization theory predicts that when 
parties in a supply chain have to make transaction-specific investments, 
the heightened risk of opportunistic behavior by their counterparties will 
drive them away from contractual relationships and toward vertical inte- 
gration.1 The pressure toward vertical integration will be especially pow- 
erful in rapidly innovating industries where swift technological change 
produces uncertainty in supply-chain relationships - that is, where the fu- 
ture states of those relationships cannot be predicted probabilistically.2 
1. Much of this transaction-cost literature is an extension of the work of Oliver 
Williamson. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 
(1985) [hereinafter Williamson, Economic Institutions] (examining economic 
organization through lens of transaction-cost economics); Oliver E. Williamson, Markets 
and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975) [hereinafter Williamson, 
Markets and Hierarchies] (discussing organization of economic activity within and 
between markets and hierarchies); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: 
The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & Econ. 233 (1979) [hereinafter 
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics] (describing main governance structures of 
transactions and how they are matched with institutions) . 
2. The reference here is to uncertainty in Knightian terms. See generally Frank H. 
Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921). In Knight's usage, uncertainty is 
distinguished from risk. Risk exists when alternative future states of the world occur with 
quantifiable probability: The future can be expressed as a probability distribution. 
Uncertainty exists when alternative future states of the world do not occur with 
quantifiable probability. Since we can mitigate or even eliminate (through insurance and 
other means) the effects of unfavorable states that occur with known probability, a risky 
world is one in which we can, with near certainty, live in the conditions we choose. Id. at 
197-232. The same is not true of an uncertain world. The Knightian distinction between 
risk and uncertainty is a useful way to illustrate the manner in which accelerating 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 18 Dec 2015 17:45:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
434 COLUMBIA LAW BEVIEW [Vol. 109:431 
In the presence of uncertainty, contemporary contract theory offers no 
general solution to the problem of assuring both efficient levels of trans- 
action-specific investment ex ante and adjustment to an efficient out- 
come ex post, after uncertainty is resolved.3 When contract cannot ad- 
dress opportunism successfully, firms should dominate markets as a 
means to organize supply relationships. 
Despite conventional industrial organization theory, however, con- 
temporary practice is moving away from vertical integration. Producers 
today recognize that they cannot themselves maintain cutting-edge tech- 
nology in every field required for the success of their products. Accord- 
ingly, companies are increasingly electing to acquire by contract compo- 
nents that in the past they would have made themselves. Put otherwise, 
instead of vertical integration, we observe vertical ¿/¿^integration in a sig- 
nificant number of industries. Moreover, in the process of vertically dis- 
integrating, firms are developing forms of contracting beyond the reach 
of existing contract theory models. 
To explain the incursions of contract on the domain of the vertically 
integrated firm, some theorists have emphasized "modularity." Their 
claim is that new production tools permit parties to more or less stand- 
ardize the interface between separate stages (or modules) of production.4 
Each module can serve many purposes and therefore fit a variety of dif- 
ferent products. The result is a moderation in the intensity of firm-spe- 
cific investments and corresponding reductions in the risk of opportu- 
nism and thus in the need for vertical integration. 
But the modularity hypothesis does not fit many of the new supply- 
chain relationships. Despite its apparent benefits, modularity is a double- 
edged sword: It may trap a firm in a no-longer-competitive technology.5 
To avoid the "modularity trap," firms instead are engaging each other in 
a process of iterative collaboration and co-design of both the interface 
and the components it joins. 
Other theorists have suggested, therefore, that the collaborative pro- 
cess that replaces vertical integration is governed by relational con- 
technology and global competition have created unique circumstances that resist 
probabilistic classification. 
3. See infra Part II. B. See generally Francine Lafontaine 8c Margaret Slade, Vertical 
Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. Econ. Literature 629, 649 (2007) 
(noting that hold-up risk "clearly pose[s] problems for long-term contracting, and those 
problems are exacerbated in volatile environments"). 
4. See Richard N. Langlois, The Vanishing Hand: The Changing Dynamics of 
Industrial Capitalism, 12 Indus. & Corp. Change 351, 370-76 (2003) [hereinafter Langlois, 
Vanishing Hand]. 
5. Henry Chesbrough, Towards a Dynamics of Modularity: A Cyclical Model of 
Technical Advance, in The Business of Systems Integration 174, 181 (Andrea Prencipe et 
al. eds., 2003). 
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trading rather than modularity.6 Here, the focus is on the dominance of 
noncontractual social and network bonds and informal cooperation as 
the mechanisms that support collaboration by constraining opportunism. 
Pure relational contracting, however, does not explain the complex con- 
tracting forms that disintegrated firms have devised to cope with the con- 
tinuing uncertainty caused by rapid technological change. 
What we see instead is a rich braiding of explicit (i.e., legally enforce- 
able) obligations and implicit (i.e., legally unenforceable) obligations. 
The explicit and implicit obligations interact within a formal governance 
structure that regulates the exchange of highly revealing information but 
does not necessarily impose legally enforceable obligations to buy or sell 
anything. This braiding creates an interactive process that constrains op- 
portunism as the parties' investments in detailed knowledge of each 
other's character and capabilities raise switching costs - the costs one 
party to a contract must incur in order to replace the other party to the 
contract.7 
In this Article, we connect this emerging contract practice to theory, 
learning from what has happened in the real world to frame a theoretical 
explanation of this cross-organizational innovation and to reconceptual- 
ize the boundaries of the firm accordingly. We argue that the vertical 
disintegration of the supply chain observed in many industries is medi- 
ated neither by fully specified explicit contracts that allow suppliers to 
produce a modular component of the ultimate product nor by entirely 
implicit relational contracts supported only by norms of reciprocity and 
the expectation of future dealings. Rather, we suggest that the changes 
in firm boundaries are mediated by a new form of contracting - what we 
call "contracting for innovation."8 Contracting for innovation supports 
iterative collaboration between firms by interweaving explicit and implicit 
terms that respond to the uncertainty inherent in the innovation process: 
The inability of the parties to specify ex ante the nature of the product to 
be produced or its performance characteristics means that the terms of 
performance will be determined by the very governance process the con- 
tract creates. 
6. See Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New 
Synthesis of American Business History, 108 Am. Hist. Rev. 404, 408-09 (2003) 
[hereinafter Lamoreaux et al., Beyond Markets] (outlining relational-contracting model). 
7. See infra Part IV.B.2.a. 
8. Lafontaine and Slade provide a useful survey of the theory and empirical studies of 
the vertical integration decision and the consequent boundary of the firm. See Lafontaine 
& Slade, supra note 3. However, the authors limit their attention to polar definitions of 
contract and vertical integration, explicitly excluding consideration of the intermediate 
collaborative case that we argue is central to understanding the new transactional structure 
that supports collaborative innovation. See id. at 631 ("[We] do not question the 
definition of vertical integration and markets that is used in the empirical studies. In most 
cases, this implies that we equate contracts with arms length transactions and contrast 
firms' decisions to rely on such transactions versus vertical integration." (citations 
omitted)). 
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As with the conventional account of the forces pushing toward verti- 
cal integration, opportunism plays a central role in explaining the organi- 
zation of disintegrated innovation in the supply chain. However, here 
the opportunism is of a character somewhat different than that discussed 
in the conventional vertical integration literature. Moreover, it is ad- 
dressed in a radically different fashion - the process of collaboration it- 
self erects a barrier to taking advantage of the other party's pecific invest- 
ments. More precisely, as the parties invest in developing information 
about their respective capabilities, the cost of switching partners, and 
therefore the constraint on opportunism, goes up in tandem. 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. We begin our discussion in Part I 
with an account of the ongoing vertical disintegration of the supply chain 
in innovative industries and consider various theoretical accounts of the 
process before offering our own assessment. Part II moves to a review of 
contract theory and its inability to offer a general solution to the canoni- 
cal contracting problem of ensuring both the efficient level of specific 
investment in the face of uncertainty and efficient production once the 
uncertainty is resolved. Part III then describes three real world exem- 
plars illustrating a continuum of contracts that support collaborative in- 
novation. We use these transactional exemplars in Part IV to frame, but 
not to prove, our theoretical account of contracting for innovation. In 
Part V, we return to the theory of the firm and suggest that there is no 
theory of the firm. Following Bengt Holmström and John Roberts,9 we 
argue that the organizational boundaries of production, and the tech- 
niques that govern conduct within and across those boundaries, re- 
present a variety of mechanisms that evolve in response to changes in the 
firm's real activities and the problems the firm must address. We con- 
clude that future work investigating parties' efforts to contract for innova- 
tion requires both qualitative and quantitative data sufficient either to 
give confidence that our account captures current practice or to instruct 
us on what we have missed. 
I. Vertical Disintegration and Collaboration Among Firms: 
Industrial Organization in an Uncertain World 
In the last two decades, the organization of firms in the United States 
and other advanced economies has changed in two fundamental ways. 
First, many transactions that used to take place within firms - for exam- 
ple, research and development, the manufacture of key components, and 
the assembly of final products - are now organized by agreements be- 
tween firms. There is thus a decrease in the proportion of economic ac- 
tivity coordinated within firms and a corresponding increase in the pro- 
9. Bengt Holmström & John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 J. 
Econ. Persp. 73 (1998). 
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portion of economic activity conducted through contract in the market.10 
Second, market transactions between firms increasingly involve novel 
forms of collaboration - particularly rich and carefully organized ex- 
changes of information designed to identify and utilize possibilities for 
innovation. This novel collaborative form constitutes contracting for 
innovation.11 
Collaborative innovation is not just a shift from hierarchy - the or- 
ganization of transactions within firms - to contract. Rather, the unavoid- 
able mutual vulnerabilities among collaborators motivate corresponding 
innovations in contractual governance to support the new transactional 
structure. In this part, we briefly canvass the most salient evidence for the 
shift from hierarchically organized transactions to interfirm collaborative 
innovation; speculate on the reasons for it; and present two contrary, but 
similarly incomplete, accounts of current economic organization to un- 
derscore the novelty of the simultaneously formal and informal mecha- 
nisms by which firms learn to innovate together. 
A. Vertical Integration and the Chandlerian Firm 
For much of the twentieth century, the dominant firms in industries 
such as steel, automobiles, electric machinery, and food processing, both 
in the United States and abroad, used the technologies of the second 
industrial revolution to achieve dramatic economies of scale through the 
mass production of standard goods with single-purpose or dedicated ma- 
chinery.12 The most conspicuous organizational feature of firms in these 
industries was vertical integration: The manufacturer of the final good 
was likely to own upstream producers of key inputs, or downstream dis- 
tributors, or both. 
Vertical integration was a response to the threat of production-pro- 
cess disruption. Because achieving economies of scale entailed large spe- 
10. The existence of vertical disintegration is not controversial. Thus, while Langlois 
disagrees with Lamoreaux and colleagues about both the causes of, and the response to, 
vertical disintegration, both treat the phenomenon's existence as fact. Compare Richard 
N. Langlois, Chandler in a Larger Frame: Markets, Transaction Costs, and Organizational 
Form in History, 5 Enterprise 8c Soc'y 355, 355 (2004) [hereinafter Langlois, Chandler in a 
Larger Frame] ("In 1977, . . . the large, vertically integrated 'Chandlerian' corporation had 
dominated the organizational landscape for nearly a century. ... A quarter century later, 
however, the Chandlerian firm no longer dominates the landscape."), with Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux et al., Against Whig History, 5 Enterprise & Soc'y 376, 376-77 (2004) 
[hereinafter Lamoreaux et al., Against Whig History] ("By the end of the twentieth 
century, it had become clear that . . . the acme of capitalist economic organization - the 
large, vertically integrated, horizontally diversified, managerially directed corporation - 
was clearly in retreat."). 
11. The discussion that follows draws on Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Neither 
Modularity nor Relational Contracting: Inter-Firm Collaboration in the New Economy, 5 
Enterprise & Soc'y 388, 388-89 (2004) (critiquing theories of Langlois, Lamoreaux, and 
others and presenting alternative interpretations of the post-Chandlerian economy). 
12. Michael J. Piore 8c Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities tor 
Prosperity 19-20 (1984). 
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cific investments in production equipment that had little or no value un- 
less used for the purpose to which it was dedicated, interruptions in the 
flow of production could be ruinous. In the familiar phrase of Alfred 
Chandler (the preeminent historian of the mass-production firm) the 
"visible hand" of managerial hierarchy supplanted market exchange as 
the organizing agent when potential costs of disruption grew.13 
Economists, following Oliver Williamson, interpreted the vertical in- 
tegration of the Chandlerian firm as a response to a particular class of 
potential disruption: the threat of hold-ups inherent in co-specialized or 
specific investments.14 When the values of two independently controlled 
investments are mutually dependent, each investor tries to induce the 
other to invest first in order to extract more favorable terms once an ir- 
revocable commitment has been made.15 Placing both assets under the 
control of a single owner - vertical integration - unblocks this logjam. 
Much of the most interesting work in the theory of the firm since the 
1980s explores the conditions under which parties to investments in in- 
terdependent assets can allocate initial contractual rights so that the one 
best able to maximize the joint value of the investment is in a position to 
bargain for exclusive control once it becomes clear what conditions actu- 
ally prevail.16 
B. The Vertical Disintegration of the Chandlerian Firm: The Shift from Risk to 
Uncertainty 
Current developments in industrial organization make the historical 
dominance of the Chandlerian firm and the view that the resolution of 
the hold-up problem is decisive to the structure of the firm rather anach- 
ronistic. Instead, a current observer sees something radically different: 
the disintegration of vertical combinations in sectors where they once 
seemed irrevocably established and the exploration of collaborative alter- 
natives to full integration in domains unencumbered by the legacy of ver- 
tical integration. Put otherwise, in certain economically significant sec- 
tors, fear of hold-ups, at least in their traditional form, no longer compels 
firms to vertically integrate. 
For example, U.S. automobile makers, such as General Motors, 
whose acquisitions of suppliers in the 1920s were often invoked to illus- 
trate the imperatives of vertical integration,17 have divested many of their 
13. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in 
American Business 1, 6-7 (1977). 
14. See sources cited supra note 1 (introducine Williamson's relevant work). 
15. Williamson, Economic Institutions, upra note 1, at 85-102; Williamson, Markets 
and Hierarchies, supra note 1, at 106-16. 
16. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
17. See, e.g., Ronald Coase, The Conduct of Economics: The Example of Fisher Body 
and General Motors, 15 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 255, 255-63 (2006) [hereinafter Coase, 
Conduct of Economics] (tracing how GM-Fisher Body contract developed in economics 
literature into frequently cited example of vertical-integration response to hold-up 
problem); Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J.L. & 
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internal component makers and emulated more competitive Japanese 
firms whose success has depended on close, continuing collaboration 
with a wide range of sophisticated outside suppliers. Similarly, pioneers 
of the mainframe computer industry, such as IBM, that initially modeled 
themselves on vertically integrated industrial firms, have sold internal 
makers of key components and now routinely purchase from outsiders 
devices they long insisted on making themselves. Many of the more re- 
cently founded firms in the personal computer industry make none of 
the key components themselves and organize final assembly by agree- 
ment with specialized "contract manufacturers" (who also play a role in 
product design).18 A sprawling literature on the modularization of pro- 
duction and the globalization of supply chains investigates this decentrali- 
zation and the organizational disintegration that accompanies it.19 
The disintegration of production, moreover, is not limited to the 
manufacture of physical goods. The production of knowledge needed to 
define and realize new generations of products is also illustrated by the 
decreasing importance of the large, centralized research laboratory in in- 
dustries, such as pharmaceuticals and telecommunications, where it was 
pioneered. Today, research is likely to be conducted by an ad hoc con- 
sortium of firms of very different sizes, often including publicly funded 
laboratories as well, all contributing highly specialized, complementary 
expertise.20 It is now routine for a large pharmaceutical company with, 
say, expertise in the metabolic pathways that produce a particular pathol- 
ogy, to search for therapeutic ompounds in concert with a small start-up 
company that has developed tools for identifying, among billions of pos- 
Econ. 105, 105-07 (2000) (describing how "Fisher Body-GM case . . . illuminates the 
economic advantages of vertical integration); Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as 
Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. 
Econ. & Org. 199, 200-11 (1988) [hereinafter Klein, Vertical Integration] (discussing how 
GM-Fisher Body contract exemplifies vertical-integration response to hold-up problem). 
18. See Dave Nelson et al., The Purchasing Machine: How the Top Ten Companies 
Use Best Practices to Manage Their Supply Chains, at xi-xii (2001) (describing IBM's shift 
to higher percentage of outside suppliers and its creation of "multi-company supply 
chain"); Joel M. Podolny 8c Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization, 24 Ann. Rev. 
Soc. 57, 68 (1998) (contrasting older, vertically integrated computer firms with younger 
disintegrated ones). 
19. See generally Gary Gereffì et al., The Governance of Global Value Chains, 12 Rev. 
Int'l Pol. Econ. 78, 79-96 (2005) (noting trend toward value-chain disintegration and 
outlining five value-chain governance types, four contract-based and one hierarchical); 
Timothy J. Sturgeon, Modular Production Networks: A New American Model of Industrial 
Organization, 11 Indus. 8c Corp. Change 451, 451-64 (2002) (noting emerging forms of 
decentralized production and outlining "modular production network model" in 
explanation). 
20. David A. Hounshell, The Evolution of Industrial Research in the United States, in 
Engines of Innovation: U.S. Industrial Research at the End of an Era 13, 51-56 (Richard S. 
Rosenbloom 8c William J. Spencer eds., 1996); Mark B. Myers & Richard S. Rosenbloom, 
Rethinking the Role of Industrial Research, in Engines of Innovation: U.S. Industrial 
Research at the End of an Era, supra, at 209, 210-11. 
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sibilities, the classes of molecules most likely to correct the metabolic de- 
fect without producing toxic side effects.21 
At the intersection of both these developments - disintegration of 
physical production into chains of component suppliers and the collabo- 
rative networking of research - is the "platform" organization of produc- 
tion. Consider a computer operating system, a current-model cell phone, 
or an airliner like the Boeing 787. In each case, the performance of the 
product depends on the performance of a series of independently pro- 
duced and rapidly developing subsystems22 - microprocessor, web 
browser, media players, and other applications in the case of an operat- 
ing system; digital signal processor, radios, and antennas for various fre- 
quencies in the case of a cell phone; wings, engines, and fuselage in the 
case of a plane. The performance of each of these subsystems depends 
correlatively on the performance of the others, as transmitted through 
the architecture - the platform - linking them all. 
In each case, the platform owner - the operating system developer, 
the cell phone maker, or the airframe producer - knows that it could not 
possibly produce all or even most of the components or applications 
whose interplay creates the platform. In particular, the producer could 
not develop or sustain the capacity for cutting-edge innovation in all the 
necessary areas for the various components. As a result, collaboration 
with groups of key technology suppliers, involving continuing mutual ad- 
justment and exchange of quintessentially proprietary knowledge, be- 
comes the norm.23 The recent emergence of a literature on platform 
21. See Walter W. Powell et al., Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of 
Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 Admin. Sci. Q. 116, 122-24 (1996) 
(noting that, because "full range of required skills" for successful biotech product 
development "could not be easily assembled under one roof[,] . . . the various participants 
in biotech have turned to ... various kinds of partnerships to make up for their lack of 
internal capabilities and resources"); Weijan Shan et al., Interfirm Cooperation and 
Startup Innovation in the Biotechnology Industry, 15 Strategic Mgmt. J. 387, 387-88 
(1994) (noting frequency and importance to successful biotech product development of 
collaboration between large, established pharmaceutical companies and small biotech 
start-ups). 
22. See Annabelle Gawer & Michael A. Cusumano, Platform Leadership: How Intel, 
Microsoft and Cisco Drive Industry Leadership 2-3 (2002) (describing "the character of 
the modern platform" as "an evolving system made of interdependent pieces that can each 
be innovated upon" (emphasis omitted)). See generally Yves Doz 8c Mikko Kosonen, Fast 
Strategy: How Strategic Agility Will Help You Stay Ahead of the Game 3-15 (2008) (tying 
success of mobile-telephony firm Nokia to "strategic agility": the ability to rapidly adapt 
business strategy to shifting market and competitive conditions). 
23. See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open 
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 
17 Harv. J.L. 8c Tech. 85, 90-96 (2003) (describing evolution toward open-access modular 
platform technology in three industries and noting that modularity facilitates innovation 
by organizing independent, complementary specialized producers) ; cf. David S. Evans, The 
Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 Yale J. on Reg. 325, 331-36 
(2003) (describing economics and conditions of platform markets, which productively 
coordinate needs and abilities of complementary participants). 
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industries and the forms of prédation that tempt platform owners24 at- 
tests to the diffusion of enduring (though sometimes fraught) coopera- 
tion across firm boundaries just as the literature on modules and the 
global value chain attests to the decline of vertical integration. 
The replacement across a wide range of industries of vertically inte- 
grated firms by interfirm collaboration poses a critical question: What 
accounts for the decline of vertical integration and the nature of the col- 
laboration that is displacing it? 
Just as stability is the precondition of mass production and vertical 
integration, instability and the volatility of markets have been their bane. 
The connection between stability, mass production, and vertical integra- 
tion was suggested above: The high fixed costs associated with specific 
investments can only be amortized over long production runs.25 The 
larger the expected demand, the greater the volume of investment that 
can be financed and the larger the economies of scale that can be 
achieved. External shocks to markets, or systemic sources of instability, 
conversely, deter investments in the tightly linked, dedicated equipment 
that makes mass production possible even as it creates the potential for 
hold-ups and so induces vertical integration. As Adam Smith, thinking of 
the economies of scale attained in the pin factories of his day, put it: 
"[T]he division of labour is limited by the extent of the market."26 
Future generations of economic historians will no doubt clarify the 
circumstances that first encouraged the progression of the vertically inte- 
grated mass-production firm and that then cut the ground from under it. 
Nevertheless, for present purposes, one set of developments is especially 
relevant. Beginning roughly in the 1980s and continuing today, the pro- 
fusion of new technological possibilities associated with what is loosely 
called "the information revolution" operated to intensify the systemic un- 
certainty faced by producers. Innovations cascaded, often leading to im- 
provement cycles that became self-perpetuating and ultimately transform- 
ative in the possibilities for new applications they afforded. The 
computer itself is a prime example: Increases in computational power 
24. See generally David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Some Economic Aspects of 
Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries, in 2 Innovation Policy and the 
Economy 1 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002) (describing changing economics of antitrust in 
industries with recent technological change and heavy investments in intellectual 
property); David S. Evans et al., A Survey of the Economic Role of Software Platforms in 
Computer-Based Industries (CESifo, Working Paper No. 1314, 2004), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=618982 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (analyzing case studies of 
computer system-based industries and examining organization and evolution of these 
industries); Jean-Charles Rochet &Jean Tiróle, Two-Sided Markets: An Overview (Mar. 12, 
2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Revieiv), available at http:// 
www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/ep.rochetover.pdf (offering an "introduction and a 
road map to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets"). 
25. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
26. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 19 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 
2000) (1776). 
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led to improved tools for the design of microprocessors, more sophisti- 
cated materials, and more exacting manufacturing techniques for realiz- 
ing the new designs. These improvements then led to further increases 
in the power of computers, and the cycle replayed. 
This increasing unpredictability is manifest as the pervasive fear of 
what Clayton Christensen calls "disruptive" technologies.27 A disruptive 
technology is a superior alternative to the currently dominant know-how 
in a particular domain that devalues the skills of incumbent industry lead- 
ers. But because the disruptive technology reflects a starkly different ap- 
proach rather than a linear improvement of the dominant method, the 
best producers and most sophisticated consumers of the dominant 
method initially are blind to the disruptive technology's potential and to 
the threat it represents. Precisely because their experience teaches them 
how to improve on what they already know and how to provide what their 
similarly focused customers believe they need, dominant producers do 
not see a threat coming from an entirely different direction. Disruptive 
technologies therefore typically get footholds in secondary or peripheral 
markets of no interest to the dominant players or their customers. They 
are then generalized to core domains of application, dislodging the in- 
cumbent producers.28 In the heyday of vertical integration, incumbency 
was the goal, allowing firms to see over the horizon of technical develop- 
ment and providing, through economies of scale, the means to realize 
the possibilities they saw. Now incumbency is seen as a burden, profi- 
ciency with current technologies obstructing the view of future direc- 
tions. Precisely the organizational capabilities that underlie success in 
the industry as currently understood blind the firm to threats from 
outside of the dominant conception.29 
If increasing uncertainty is inimical to integrated forms of industrial 
organization based on specific investments, we should find disintegrated 
forms in uncertain environments. We do. Two such responses to uncer- 
tainty - industrial districts (or "clusters") and systems engineering - are 
especially interesting here. Each provides guidance in understanding the 
form of interfirm cooperation that has developed in the post- 
Chandlerian economy and that is our focus in this Article. 
27. Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, at xviii-xix (1st Collins Bus. 
Essentials ed., HarperCollins Publishers 2006) (1997) (introducing and explaining 
concept of "disruptive technologies"). 
28. Examples of this phenomenon include electric-arc or mini-mill steel producers, 
hydraulically activated earth-moving equipment, and - in the realm of general production 
technologies - -Japanese or lean production methods. See id. at xxi, 1 72-76. Christensen 
argues - unchallenged, so far as we know - that all established technologies are in 
principle disruptable in this way. 
29. See id. at 3-4, 15-26. The replacement of the centralized research laboratory, 
where stable project groups could pursue a line of research for a decade or more, by ad 
hoc research consortia that connect expertise from disjoint domains reflects this 
transformation. 
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First, consider clusters. Clusters are geographically compact agglom- 
erations of small- and medium-sized firms in industries characterized by 
volatile or rapidly shifting demand, each firm specializing in a particular 
phase of production or in a particular production process. Finished 
goods are produced by groups of firms collaborating in rapidly shifting 
constellations.30 By recombining and thereby augmenting fragmented, 
specialized, and mostly tacit knowledge, a multiplicity of cooperative 
firms in a cluster adapts rapidly to changes in the economic environment. 
Agglomerations of this kind played an important role in the industri- 
alization of parts of Europe and the United States from the late eight- 
eenth century onward.31 Variants are common in more recent industrial- 
izes ranging from Japan to Taiwan to Brazil to Kenya, and in the 
development of Silicon Valley.32 Since the turbulence in the markets for 
mass-produced goods in the mid-1980s made valuable the ease with which 
clustered firms could recombine as conditions changed, clusters are a mi- 
crocosm of the "new" economy, able to prosper in much more volatile 
conditions than the vertically integrated large corporation. 
Second, consider systems engineering. Systems engineering also fa- 
cilitates cooperation, but, in contrast o free-form combinations of clus- 
ters, it supports formalized cooperation among very large firms to pro- 
duce complex products in very uncertain technological environments. 
Systems engineering emerged in the United States after World War II to 
develop weapons systems that were then at the frontier of technological 
capability.33 Since no single firm could produce, say, both the inertial 
guidance system and the rocket motor needed for a missile, coordination 
30. Up to some limit, the more firms in a cluster, the easier it is for each firm to find 
the partners it needs and the lower its costs of production. Up to the size limit, therefore, 
firms in a cluster constitute positive externalities for each other. The attraction of these 
positive externalities i (part of) what draws firms to the cluster in the first place, causing 
agglomeration. See Edgar M. Hoover & Raymond Vernon, Anatomy of a Metropolis: The 
Changing Distribution of People and Jobs Within the New York Metropolitan Region 
49-55 (1959); Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. Pol. 
Econ. 483, 484-85 (1991). 
31. See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, World of Possibilities: Flexibility and 
Mass Production in Western Industrialization 47-48, 155-56 (1997) (discussing French silk 
industry and German cutlery industry) . 
32. On Japan, see David Friedman, The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial 
Development and Political Change in Japan 177-200 (1988). On Silicon Valley, see 
AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and 
Route 128, at 29-58 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High 
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 
74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575 (1999). On Taiwan, see AnnaLee Saxenian, The New Argonauts: 
Regional Advantage in a Global Economy 122-96 (2006). On Brazil and Latin America, 
see Elisa Giuliani et al., Upgrading in Global Value Chains: Lessons from Latin American 
Clusters, 33 World Dev. 549 (2005). And on Italy, see Roberta Rabellotti et al., Italian 
Industrial Districts on the Move: Where Are They Going?, 17 Eur. Plan. Stud. 19 (2009). 
33. These weapon systems included the Polaris submarine-launched intercontinental 
ballistic missile, its land-based counterpart, the Minuteman, and the DEW line early- 
warning radar system. See generally Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: 
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of specialist "subsystem" suppliers was necessary. Responsibility for the 
elaboration of the initial design and its refinement in collaboration with 
the specialist suppliers was entrusted to a prime contractor. Related 
methods of systems integration developed in response to current condi- 
tions are common today at the (vastly extended) technical frontier.34 
C. Alternative Characterizations of the Emergent Institutional Framework: 
Modular, Relational, and Iterative Collaboration 
The preceding examples - clusters and systems engineering - but- 
tress the claim that disintegrated industrial organization is a creature of 
context - and in particular a response to uncertain environments. How- 
ever, they suggest quite different and inconsistent interpretations of how 
disintegrated firms cooperate. Cooperation in clusters is extremely fluid; 
the creation of new firms, the re-contracting among existing ones, and 
the circulation of skilled workers from firm to firm is continuous. Organ- 
ization seems highly informal, indeed nearly spontaneous. Mutual trust, 
born of long and close observation of actual behavior, underpins com- 
plex transactions memorialized in a handshake. In contrast, the organi- 
zation of cooperation in systems engineering is highly formalized. Design 
parameters are specified in great detail and translated into precise formal 
contractual obligations with the intent of rendering the transaction as 
explicit as possible. In systems engineering, informality is treated as an 
unruly threat to exchange, not its foundation. Each of these examples 
has helped inspire a current but quite distinct interpretation of the dis- 
integrated industrial organization emerging today. 
1. Modular Collaboration. - One interpretation, advanced in the 
work of Richard Langlois, elaborates and generalizes the experience of 
systems engineering.35 Its central claim is that the availability of new 
tools of design and production allows the development of technical stan- 
dards or design rules that standardize the interfaces between organiza- 
tionally separate stages of production. This standardization of interfaces 
is thought to so reduce the volume of information required for interrirai 
coordination that products can be decomposed into distinct modules, 
each of which can be produced in virtual isolation from the others.36 
Each producer need know only the interface that connects its contribu- 
tion to the product; it need know little about the other components or 
interfaces. At the extreme, one can think of a "Lego-like" manufacturing 
process, with different firms producing differently shaped, sized, and 
colored pieces, all linked by a common form of connection. In Langlois's 
Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (1972); Harvey Sapolsky, 
Inventing Systems Integration, in The Business of Systems Integration, supra note 5, at 15. 
34. See, e.g., Michael H. Best, The Geography of Systems Integration, in The Business 
of Systems Integration, supra note 5, at 201, 209-10 (describing relation between Intel, the 
microprocessor manufacturer, and suppliers of its chip-making equipment) . 
35. See Langlois, Vanishing Hand, supra note 4. 
36. Id. at 374. 
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view, the formulation of standards and modules, periodically refined, 
now allows firms to achieve economies of scale and scope through the 
market rather than through the Chandlerian firm.37 Langlois focuses, 
however, only on the opportunity for market substitutes to vertical inte- 
gration; he does not address the form those arrangements actually take. 
2. Relational Collaboration. - A contrary interpretation, advanced by 
Naomi Lamoreaux, Daniel Raff, and Peter Temin is, in turn, a variant of 
the stylized experience of industrial districts or clusters.38 Lamoreaux, 
Raff, and Temin see the new economy as a shift away from coordination 
by managerial hierarchies in vertically integrated firms toward coordina- 
tion through long-term relationships, based on "informal restraints on 
self-interested behavior," among networks of formally separate firms.39 
Where Langlois emphasizes the resurgence of the market over the visible 
hand of management, they emphasize the resurgence of social bonds as 
the underpinnings of economic relations. In the pre-Chandlerian era, 
they write, "[Bļusinesspeople in ... industrial communities interacted 
socially as well as economically, and the resulting multidimensional rela- 
tionships facilitated cooperation for purposes besides production."40 Re- 
lational coordination is possible again today, they argue, because cost re- 
ductions in transportation and communications allow multidimensional 
relationships to develop at a distance, all of which gives decentralized net- 
works of firms the flexibility to respond to the increasingly differentiated 
demands of consumers. These flexible relationships are of particular 
value "where there is a great deal of uncertainty about the direction of 
technological change and both parties can benefit from the pooling of 
information and resources that trust makes possible."41 Put another way, 
the chief advantage of formal disintegration of the firm is to create the 
possibility for sustained informal cooperation between independent pro- 
37. See Langlois, Chandler in a Larger Frame, supra note 10, at 365-71 (finding that 
historical movement from market o hierarchical organization is actually bidirectional, that 
markets, when conditions allow for appropriate mediation by standards or modules, can be 
equal or superior to hierarchies) . While Langlois acknowledges that many of the market 
substitutes for vertical integration cannot be reduced to "hard modularity," he is explicit 
that he is "not really attempting to pronounce on which specific kinds of contractual 
arrangements constitute the New Economy. [His] claim is only that they are 'market' 
arrangements in the broad sense . . . ." Richard N. Langlois, Rejoinder 5 (July 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http:// 
web.uconn.edu/ ciom/Rejoinder.pdf. As he puts it in Langlois, Vanishing Hand, supra 
note 4, at 376, "[a] s a central tendency, however, the buffering functions of management 
are devolving to the mechanisms of modularity and the market - informational 
decomposition, flexibility, and risk spreading." 
38. See Lamoreaux et al., Beyond Markets, supra note 6. 
39. Id. at 430. 
40. Id. at 417. 
41. Id. at 409. 
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ducers, a different vector from the highly formalized exchanges stressed 
by Langlois.42 
We share Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin's recognition that uncer- 
tainty has driven the disintegration process, and agree that relationships 
between firms substitute for vertical integration. However, again, the crit- 
ical point from our perspective is to understand these relationships: How 
is collaborative innovation organized?43 
3. Iterative Collaboration. - Examining the limits of modularity, and 
how firms address those limits, calls attention to a type of cooperative 
institution - more formal than "relationships" but designed to facilitate 
learning among collaborating peers by means much less formal than hier- 
archical ordering.44 This mid-range institutional form, neither purely re- 
lational nor based on a hierarchical specification of modular interfaces, is 
indispensable to cooperation among firms in platform settings, modern 
supply chains, or collaborative research and development. Given the re- 
lentless innovation of the modern economy, it is unsurprising that there 
are costs as well as benefits to fixing standards for technical interfaces for 
components and modules. In the short term, the cost is a sacrifice in 
performance of the product as a whole. Because the standard setter itself 
cannot observe the technological cutting edge across every field, the stan- 
dards specified will be less ambitious than the outcome of a collaborative 
process among parties who are at the cutting edge. In a careful study of 
the hard disk drive industry, for example, Clayton Christensen found that 
only at the low-performance end of the market could the performance of 
finished products be completely predicted from the performance of their 
component modules.45 Thus, modularization is not a stable strategy be- 
cause it leaves open too many possibilities for competitive improvements 
42. The informal foundations of market adjustment in general and innovation in 
particular are developed in an important strand of network sociology that begins with 
Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 Am. J. Soc. 1360 (1973), and proceeds 
to Brian Uzzi, Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of 
Embeddedness, 42 Admin. Sci. Q. 35 (1997) and Ronald S. Burt, The Network Structure of 
Social Capital, 22 Res. Organizational Behav. 345 (2000). 
43. Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin describe the new transaction patterns that have 
arisen to substitute for vertical integration in the late twentieth century as "repeat 
interactions in which the parties involved made decisions about price and about the quality 
and quantity of output through a process of negotiation." Lamoreaux et al., Against Whig 
History, supra note 10, at 384. However, this characterization does not advance the matter. 
That the resolution is through negotiations is either tautological - in the absence of a fully 
state-contingent contract, how else could the response to uncertainty be resolved - or 
simply undertheorized because current contract theory provides no guide as to how that 
renegotiation would take place. See infra Part U.C. 
44. The following draws on Charles F. Sabel, A Real-Time Revolution in Routines, in 
The Firm as a Collaborative Community 106 (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., 
2006) [hereinafter Sabel, Real-Time Revolution]. 
45. See Clayton M. Christensen et al., Disruption, Disintegration and the Dissipation 
of Differentiability, 11 Indus. & Corp. Change 955, 966-69 (2002). 
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that would cumulatively undermine the initial interfaces.46 Therefore, in 
contrast o modular interfaces specified by the standard setter, an inter- 
esting set of firms engages in a process of iterative co-design, in which 
suppliers contribute to the redefinition of interface specifications for new 
products by building on their experience in manufacturing existing mod- 
els. These disciplines of iterated co-design are neglected both by those 
who stress modularization and by those who find those connections in 
informal relationships; in the former they are ignored, and in the latter 
they are underspecified. 
Iterated co-design establishes a first idea of what and how to produce 
through benchmarking: an exacting survey of current products and 
processes, augmented by assessments of promising new techniques. 
From this provisional starting point, each party responsible for a constitu- 
ent component proposes modifications of the initial plan, having taken 
into account the implications of like proposals by the other subunits for 
its own activities. (This process - radically decentralized compared to the 
coordination provided by the prime contractor in systems engineering - 
is often called simultaneous engineering.) Provisional designs are then 
evaluated and refined. Once production begins, systems of error detec- 
tion and correction focus on breakdowns in the new routines to trigger a 
search for weaknesses of the design or production process that escaped 
earlier examination. This root-cause analysis traces disruption back to its 
original source, presumed to be distant from the proximate cause of the 
breakdown. Participant firms must routinely question the suitability of 
their current routines and continuously readjust their approach in light 
of the contributions of their collaborators.47 
Taken together, these iterative, cooperative techniques play an im- 
portant part in shaping the links that connect firms in the vertically dis- 
integrated economy. As each collaborating party monitors and learns 
from the others' participation in the process, observation renders tacit 
knowledge at least partly explicit, easing long-range collaboration (by re- 
ducing the chances that the parties take incompatible things for granted) 
and reducing the chance that all the parties cling to limiting assumptions 
held by any single party.48 Moreover, these methods also address the gov- 
ernance problems arising from the mutual vulnerability inherent in such 
46. There are, moreover, long-term costs to modularity in that a commitment o 
particular interface standards can lock component and end-product manufacturers into 
obsolescent product architecture. This is what Chesbrough calls a "modularity trap." 
Chesbrough, supra note 5, at 181. In the firm, "the focus on developing products to 
compete within the standard eventually erodes the amount of system-level knowledge." Id. 
47. For a fuller discussion on which this presentation draws, see generally Susan 
Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While Controlling 
Opportunism, 9 Indus. & Corp. Change 443 (2000); Sabel, Real-Time Revolution, supra 
note 44. 
48. On the high level of general skills needed by "supply-chain" integrators to 
coordinate product development and other functions across firm boundaries, see Geoffrey 
G. Parker & Edward G. Anderson, Jr., From Buyer to Integrator: The Transformation of
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open-ended collaboration among different entities. The exchanges of in- 
formation required for benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and er- 
ror detection and correction increase the mutual transparency of the ac- 
tors to each other, revealing to each how rigorously and cooperatively the 
others scan for solutions in addressing joint problems of design or qual- 
ity. By such monitoring, each party learns its counterparty's capabilities 
to operate in this transactional structure and to perform the substantive 
tasks required for the particular product. This framework establishes the 
position to which we now turn. 
In the next Part, we address the contractual structure of collaborative 
innovation: how learning by monitoring is institutionalized in forms of 
contractual governance that allow the parties to rapidly establish confi- 
dence in each other's intentions and in their joint capacity to accomplish 
the tasks they set for themselves. 
II. The Contracting Response: Coping with 
Continuous Uncertainty 
In Part I, we described the effects of continuing technological 
change on contemporary economic organization. In some markets and 
for some products, increases in the complexity of the technology and in 
the rate of change have made it difficult for a single firm to sustain state- 
of-the-art capacity across all the technologies necessary for successful 
product development. The response has been collaborative innovation 
across organizational boundaries with, for example, upstream and down- 
stream participants in the supply chain specializing in particular technol- 
ogies and the ultimate product resulting from cooperation among differ- 
ent organizations, each having contributed its special expertise. This 
ongoing process of vertical disintegration has stimulated the develop- 
ment of networks of explicit contracts among collaborating firms. In this 
Part, we argue that conventional contract theory cannot explain this 
process. 
The emerging contractual networks are incompatible with the mod- 
els of economic organization that purport to describe the modern pro- 
duction process. On the one hand, the explicit contracts that govern 
these new collaborative relationships do not fit the central tendency to- 
ward modularity described by Langlois, whose model has, as an end 
point, (relatively) complete contingent contracting in which parties spec- 
ify the relevant interfaces. On the other hand, the new supply patterns 
are not regulated simply by noncontractual continuing relations and tit- 
for-tat enforcement - as suggested by the relational models of 
the Supply-Chain Manager in the Vertically Disintegrating Firm, 11 Production & 
Operations Mgmt 75, 80-88 (2002). 
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Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin.49 Rather, what we see emerging are orga- 
nizational networks linked by explicit, formal contracts that rely on col- 
laboration and co-design to stimulate continuous improvement in prod- 
uct development and engineering. Because the collaborative process is 
continuous, the parties operate in an ongoing state of uncertainty, one in 
which operational decisions must be continually updated and refined. 
This phenomenon of continuous uncertain change poses a unique chal- 
lenge for contract design. 
In this environment, we observe contracts in which parties create 
elaborate governance mechanisms in lieu of the more familiar isk-alloca- 
tion provisions of conventional contracts.50 The contracts can be arrayed 
along a continuum, ranging from contractual relationships that impose 
no formally enforceable obligations on the parties but that contemplate 
ongoing relationships of unlimited duration, to collaborative research 
agreements that look to the development of a particular product and a 
consequent end game. In each case, there is an iterated process of con- 
tinuous collaboration and innovation that functionally substitutes for ex 
ante specification of the desired product. In each case, the parties make 
relation-specific investments in learning about their collaborator's capa- 
bilities, and these investments erect barriers to either party's taking ad- 
vantage of their mutual dependencies. Thus, even in relationships that 
one might traditionally describe as stable, the spillover effects of continu- 
ous innovation create "coordination cascades" - innovation by one party 
requires coordination with a second party, whose response then requires 
adjustment by and further coordination with the first party. 
None of the familiar mechanisms for coping with the problem of 
contractual incompleteness adequately responds to the challenge posed 
by structuring transactions in the face of continuous uncertainty. Never- 
theless, while theory and conventional legal practice have lagged behind 
the conditions in the marketplace, transactional lawyers in a number of 
industries, apparently responding to their clients' need to structure new 
relationships in light of the constraints that uncertainty imposed, have 
begun creating the novel contracting patterns whose characteristics we 
now address. 
49. While we are confident hat they would include contracting for innovation within 
their general framework as set out supra Part I.C.2, the hard task is understanding the 
structures that we actually observe. 
50. The distinction we draw between risk and uncertainty does not imply that the 
"conventional" contracts that we distinguish from those we study here are free from 
uncertainty in Knightian terms. For example, both "types" of contracts must account for 
moral hazard and other kinds of endogenous uncertainty. Rather, the distinction is 
between those contracts characterized by continuous uncertainty and those where relevant 
uncertainties such as product performance are resolved during the life of the contract. 
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A. Elements of Contractual Governance Under Continuous Uncertainty 
The location of the innovative activity distinguishes the contracts of 
interest o us from more traditional relational contracting. In the new 
arrangements, innovation is the product of a joint effort by two or more 
organizations; it is metaphorically situated between them and is depen- 
dent on both. The development of the Boeing 787 aircraft is a good 
example. Innovation in the design and manufacture of the wing, the 
province of one supplier (or group of suppliers), is dependent on the 
design and manufacture of the fuselage, the province of a different sup- 
plier (or group of suppliers), and vice versa.51 Innovation in one struc- 
ture must mesh with innovation in the other in order for either to be 
successful. The design of the wing must not only be compatible with the 
design of the fuselage on all relevant dimensions; the two must physically 
fit together. Innovation is thus a collaborative and iterative process 
rather than a discrete product supplied by a party upstream in the supply 
chain according to specifications set by a downstream customer.52 
Precisely how have parties to these new collaborative relationships 
structured their contracts? We set out to answer this question in two 
stages. We began our research for this Article with a small group of 
twelve contracts, each of which committed the parties to a collaborative 
process of design and production. From that initial group we selected 
three exemplars, described in detail in Part III, that reflect distinct pat- 
terns of collaborative production and supply. The Deere-Stanadyne con- 
tract addresses collaboration but without any product/sale obligation;53 
the Apple-SCI contract couples collaboration with production for a fixed 
period, while contemplating joint efforts for a longer term to which, how- 
ever, neither party was obligated;54 and the Warner-Lambert-Ligand con- 
tract covers the collaborative search for a product and the noncollabora- 
tive commercialization of it.55 
51. For a description of collaborative innovation in the production of commercial 
aircraft, see Alan O'Sullivan, Why Tense, Unstable, and Diverse Relations Are Inherent in 
Co-designing with Suppliers: An Aerospace Case Study, 15 Indus. & Corp. Change 221, 
228-44 (2006). 
52. See id. at 222 (describing "complex coupling" involved in airplane co-design, 
which "leads to iteration across the many design tasks and requires the designers to 
proceed in parallel"). 
53. The Deere-Stanadyne contract obligates neither party to supply or purchase 
anything. Instead, it establishes only the terms of future purchases, should they occur, and 
includes Stanadyne in already established formal programs covering Deere 's evaluation of 
a supplier's characteristics and performance. See infra text accompanying notes 76-82. 
54. The Apple-SCI contract is a turnkey arrangement for production of a substantial 
fraction of Apple's personal computers. The arrangement necessarily involves 
collaborative, iterative innovation to coordinate changing technology and demand with 
changes in the manufacturing and assembly process but does not bind either party after 
the first hree years. See infra text accompanying notes 90-93. 
55. The Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract concerns a collaborative ffort o discover 
and commercialize pharmaceutical products over a specified term and specifies the 
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As the foregoing suggests, the transactions governed by these con- 
tracts hare a number of characteristics. First, the primary output is an 
innovative "product,"56 one whose characteristics, costs, and manufac- 
ture, because of uncertainty, cannot be specified ex ante. Second, 
neither party alone has the capacity to specify and develop the product's 
characteristics, costs, and methods of manufacture; hence, there must be 
collaboration among companies with different capabilities. Third, the 
process of specification and development will be iterative: Individual de- 
sign elements will depend on the recurrent input from those working 
upstream or downstream and from those working on other design ele- 
ments. Thus, central to these transactions are communication and coop- 
eration across the two (or more) firms - the design, specification, and 
determination of manufacturing characteristics will be the result of re- 
peated interactive collaborative fforts by employees of separate firms 
with distinct capabilities. 
These commonalities highlight the conceptual questions that any ex- 
planatory theory must resolve. How do the parties deal with the 
problems of opportunism and the risk of hold-up that seem endemic in 
such interactive collaborative relationships? In particular, how do the 
parties constrain the temptation to exploit for private purposes informa- 
tion that is developed collaboratively? And how do the parties divide the 
eventual gains from the collaborative relationship when uncertainty pre- 
cludes specifying the division ex ante and specific investment makes ex 
post allocation subject to hold-up? Is this temptation to use jointly pro- 
duced information opportunistically and to hold up the counterparty 
when dividing gains adequately deterred by the elaborate set of formal 
and informal governance mechanisms that are a defining characteristic 
of these collaborative contracts? 
B. The Technology of Contracts: The Problem of Incompleteness57 
To begin to answer these questions, recall first he principal reasons 
that transacting parties seek to write explicit contracts and the limits to 
such efforts. Explicit contracts can protect, and thereby encourage, spe- 
options at the end of collaboration if the parties' efforts result in a marketable product. 
See infra text accompanying notes 101-103. 
56. We use the term "product" in this part to describe a range of innovative outputs: 
It might refer to a single product, but it also might refer to a stream of innovations (for 
example, the Deere-Stanadyne, Apple-SCI, and General Motors-Fisher Body contracts 
discussed, respectively, infra Parts III.A, III.B, and notes 120, 169-170 and accompanying 
text) or intellectual property that results in a single patent or patentable things (for 
example, the Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract discussed infra Part III.C). 
57. This discussion draws on Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating 
Litigation in Contract Design, 115 Yale LJ. 814 (2006), and Robert E. Scott 8c George G. 
Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
187 (2005). 
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cific investments,58 which are often critical to transactions that contem- 
plate more than a single simultaneous exchange. Yet contractual terms 
that encourage both parties to make efficient ex ante investments in the 
subject matter of the contract may undermine the ex post efficiency of 
the transaction if completion is compelled whenever one party still bene- 
fits, even when circumstances have so changed that the result is a net loss 
for the parties jointly.59 Thus, the goal of efficient specific investment ex 
ante and of efficient ex post trade will often be at loggerheads when par- 
ties contract under uncertainty. The commitment necessary to motivate 
specific investments that maximize the contractual surplus will typically 
conflict with the flexibility needed to halt transactions (even when one 
party will still benefit) that have insufficient net value when uncertainty is 
resolved. 
To see why, consider a benchmark solution to the dual objective of 
ex ante and ex post efficiency: a complete, legally enforceable, state-con- 
tingent contract. Such a contract specifies ex ante the parties' obligations 
in each possible ex post state of the world and is enforceable according to 
its terms, thereby assuring that performance occurs when, but only when, 
it is efficient. But while complete state-contingent contracts theoretically 
can address the tension between efficient ex ante investment and effi- 
cient ex post performance, the transaction costs of contracting frustrate 
this outcome. Of particular importance are the information barriers that 
prevent parties from controlling moral hazard when the future states of 
the world depend on their own actions. As a result, when the level of 
uncertainty is high, contracts will be incomplete because it simply costs 
too much (or may be impossible) for contracting parties to foresee and 
then describe appropriately the contractual outcomes for all (or even 
most) of the possible future states of the world that might materialize.60 
The information costs of contracting are incurred in two stages. Ex 
ante contracting costs are those of anticipating contingencies that may 
affect efficient performance and therefore efficient investment, and of 
writing a contract that specifies an outcome for each. Ex post enforce- 
ment costs are those of observing and proving any fact relevant to deter- 
mining the actual state of the world (given that the parties have an incen- 
tive to misrepresent reality) . It is costly to specify what should happen in 
different future states, and it is costly to prove what actually did happen. 
58. Cf. supra notes 1-3, 13 and accompanying text (describing vertical integration as 
the more efficient means of mitigating hold-up risk of specific investment) . 
59. An ex post efficient contract should seek to ensure that exchange proceeds in all 
circumstances in which it produces value, but not otherwise. Trade is inefficient when the 
realized cost of performance to the promisor turns out to exceed the value of performance 
to the promisee. 
60. See, e.g., Oliver Hart 8c John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 
Rev. Econ. Stud. 115, 124-26 (1999); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts 
and Renegotiation, 56 Econometrica 755, 756 (1988); Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts 
and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J.L. Econ. 8c Org. 119, 123 (1988). 
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Both ex ante and ex post contracting costs prevent parties from writing 
complete state-contingent contracts. 
Facing uncertainty and information costs, how should parties formal- 
ize their contracts? One option is to write an intentionally incomplete 
contract with precise, unchanging terms - i.e., determinate outcomes 
that apply across the board regardless of the eventual state of the world. 
For example, Buyer might contract with Seller at a fixed price for the 
manufacture of a precisely specified, customized machine, where Seller 
promises to deliver and Buyer promises to pay even if subsequent events 
increase Seller's costs or reduce Buyer's value. Such "hard" terms bind 
the parties to their respective commitments, which motivates each party 
as promisee to undertake relation-specific investments and encourages 
each party as promisor to take cost-effective steps to reduce anticipated 
risk-bearing costs. 
But, because the hard terms of such an intentionally incomplete con- 
tract do not change based on what actually happens, they may be ineffi- 
cient ex post, when the passage of time replaces uncertainty with fact. As 
suggested above, the actual cost to Seller of manufacturing the custom- 
ized machine precisely as specified in the contract may exceed its value to 
Buyer.61 Both parties would prefer to design their contract ex ante so as 
to avoid the possibility of inefficient production ex post. 
In theory, one solution to the inflexibility of hard terms is for the 
parties to renegotiate the contract once uncertainties are resolved. But if 
parties have made specific investments in the contract, later renegoti- 
ation raises the risk of a hold-up. Increased risk of hold-up, in turn, un- 
dermines the incentive to make those investments in the first place.62 
Alternatively, if information costs are high because neither the likeli- 
hood nor character of ex post change can be anticipated, the parties may 
emphasize ex post rather than ex ante efficiency in seeking to balance the 
two. In that case, they could draft a formal contract with vague standards, 
i.e., "soft" terms that invite subsequent adjustment to reflect what actually 
happened. Thus, for example, Seller might agree to adjust in good faith 
the specifications for the customized machine if the cost of providing the 
machine as originally specified later proved greater than its value to 
Buyer. By agreeing to "good faith adjustment," the parties seek to ensure 
that their contract is efficient both ex ante (by constraining ex post hold- 
up) and ex post (by providing for a mechanism that assures that the ma- 
chine is produced if and only if it is efficient o do so). 
But a contract that uses soft terms to address both ex ante uncer- 
tainty and the risk of ex post hold-up raises a moral hazard problem of its 
own through the actual operation of the soft terms. Here, moral hazard 
61. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. 
Rev. 1089, 1099 (1981). 
62. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. 
Pol. Econ. 1119, 1151 (1990) [hereinafter Hart & Moore, Property Rights]; Klein, Vertical 
Integration, supra note 17, at 202-04 & n.5. 
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results from a promisor with the discretion to adjust performance as con- 
ditions change always choosing the best alternative for himself rather 
than the "good faith" adjustment required by the soft terms, even though 
the self-interested choice is unlikely to be best for the promisee or to 
maximize the parties' joint welfare.63 Nor can the moral hazard problem 
necessarily be solved by delegating authority to determine the proper ad- 
justment to a court. Soft terms such as "good-faith adjustment" remain as 
intractably ambiguous to judges as to the parties themselves, especially 
since the latter can act in bad faith in establishing the facts and in per- 
suading the former what "good faith" should entail. Given, therefore, 
that a judge or other third party verifying contract performance under a 
broad standard of "good-faith adjustment" may mistakenly permit the 
promisor to substitute a lower-cost proxy for the agreed performance 
(say, by tendering an inferior machine), the promisor will be tempted to 
do so, even when this reduces joint welfare. 
In short, neither hard nor soft contract terms can, standing alone, 
solve the problem of incomplete contracts. Under conditions of uncer- 
tainty, therefore, parties predictably seek to optimize total contracting 
costs by trading off the respective benefits and costs of commitment and 
flexibility. They can do this by shifting costs between the front and back 
end - the two stages - of the contracting process. As the preceding dis- 
cussion illustrates, a core feature of contract design is the allocation of 
resources between drafting and enforcement. When the parties agree, 
for instance, to use their best efforts or to behave in a commercially rea- 
sonable manner, the subsequent adjudication of contractual disputes 
concerning their efforts or behavior requires a court to give precise 
meaning to those vague phrases. Thus, by using soft terms, parties dele- 
gate the specification of performance requirements to a court at the back 
end of the contracting process. The parties must bear the expected costs 
of litigation (including the costs of moral hazard in their conduct). But 
because a court has the benefit of some information unavailable to the 
parties at the time of formation, adjudication potentially allows them to 
benefit from more efficient performance standards than they could have 
specified ex ante. Alternatively, when the parties agree to precise (hard) 
terms, such as the obligation to supply a precisely specified, customized 
machine at a fixed price, they withdraw authority from courts to deter- 
mine their particular performance obligations and instead direct enforce- 
ment of the obligations specified in advance. As noted above, this strat- 
egy requires the parties to fix performance obligations that rely on mere 
estimates of the likelihood of various future events rather than the actual 
occurrence of those events that is available to a court at a later date. The 
parties thus trade off the benefits of ex ante precision (with resulting ex 
63. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 Yale LJ. 541, 601-05 (2003). 
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post inefficiency) against the hindsight advantage of the court in later 
litigation tempered by the moral hazard costs inherent in the process. 
C. Contracting Under Continuous Uncertainty: The Limits of Contract Theory 
The preceding discussion highlights the problem that contracting 
for collaborative innovation must confront. As discussed in Part ILA, the 
transactional structure must provide mechanisms for the sharing of infor- 
mation between the parties. In particular, the parties need credible in- 
formation about each other's technical capacity, ability to manage a col- 
laborative effort, capability for cooperative interaction, and especially 
each party's capacity to deal productively with disagreements that neces- 
sarily will arise when the characteristics of the desired innovation cannot 
be specified in advance. Moreover, this sharing of information is a con- 
tinuous, collaborative process, one that requires asymmetric investments 
by each party as the collaboration proceeds along the critical path. 
Under these conditions, the contract design problem is particularly 
acute, because the collaborative process generates continuous uncer- 
tainty. As we have just seen, uncertainty creates problems for contract 
design, forcing parties to balance ex ante and ex post efficiencies. But, 
under conditions of continuous uncertainty, the problem is even more 
significant. When uncertainty is continuous, the parties cannot simply 
agree on the optimal trade off between ex ante and ex post informational 
advantages. There is no ex post period in which hindsight can be used to 
optimize a contractual relationship; the parties are continually cycling be- 
tween different combinations of ex ante and ex post states. The crucial 
question thus becomes whether one's counterparty acts opportunisti- 
cally - that is, takes advantage of the collaborative process to capture a 
larger share of the jointly created surplus (say, by using jointly produced 
information for its private benefit) ,64 And the key challenge for transac- 
tional design is correspondingly to support the cooperative effort by con- 
straining the strategic behavior made possible by ex ante specific invest- 
ments in the collaborative project. 
As discussed above, renegotiation of the contract ex post can, in the- 
ory, assure both ex ante and ex post efficiency in the face of uncertainty. 
Once the uncertainty is resolved, parties can in effect write a new contract 
specifying the decision the party in control should take - whether to per- 
64. Cf. Static Control Components v. Mitsubishi Kagaku Imaging Corp., No. 
l:06CV00154, 2007 WL 586710, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 21, 2007) (outlining plaintiffs claim 
that defendant breached confidentiality provision by selling co-developed products to 
third parties and favored other competitors over plaintiff); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Emisphere 
Techs., Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 668, 693 (S.D. 111. 2006) (finding Emisphere entitled to 
terminate contract for collaborative research where Lilly created a secret research team 
that used the jointly produced information for purposes outside the collaboration); 
Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Elan Pharmaceuticals, 781 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96-97 (App. Div. 2004) 
(describing breakdown in contractual relationship that occurred when defendant allegedly 
used information transferred pursuant to contract at issue to support "separate research 
program"). 
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form, alter the terms of performance, abandon the transaction, or make a 
side payment. This renegotiation can achieve ex post efficiency through 
Coasian bargaining: If a contract remains profitable to the promisor and 
yet is inefficient, he promisee will "bribe" the promisor not to perform. 
As we have seen, however, renegotiation addresses only half the 
problem. It creates the flexibility to achieve ex post efficiency. But the 
prospect of renegotiation itself creates the possibility of hold-ups, which 
in turn undermines ex ante efficient investment. Contract and property- 
rights theorists have proposed solutions to the hold-up problem that rely 
on regulating renegotiation to constrain the eventual sharing of the sur- 
plus. For example, property rights theorists propose favoring the "effi- 
cient" owner, the one whose human capital is most complementary to the 
physical assets deployed in the project and whose propensity to invest in 
those assets is therefore most sensitive to the assurance of continuing con- 
trol of them. Contract theorists, in turn, have proposed several alterna- 
tive mechanisms to increase one party's bargaining power in the future 
negotiations, for example, by allocating to that party the rights to control 
key decisions or property rights in assets specific to the exchange.65 
From these perspectives, a contract sets the field for future renegotiation 
of the terms of exchange after uncertainty has been resolved. 
But efforts to constrain hold-ups by ex ante assignment of ex post 
decision rights fail for the contracts that concern us here. If there is no 
clear separation between the ex ante contract hat supports transaction- 
specific investment and the resolution of uncertainty ex post, the identity 
of the party to whom decision or property rights should be allocated will 
continually shift, if it can be detected at all. Assignment of decision rights 
to this ephemeral owner will thus be meaningless. The discussion in Part 
I described a new pattern of collaborative innovation in the supply chain, 
one characterized by multiple information flows, iterative design, and 
mutual adaptation, all between separate firms. This network production 
responds to a technological and commercial environment where change 
is constant, adaptation must take place quickly and continuously, and the 
technology necessary to produce a cutting-edge product is not found in a 
single firm. The parties are not contracting over a temporary state whose 
resolution can be anticipated with enough precision to choose the effi- 
cient structure of post-resolution egotiation.66 Rather, they are con- 
tracting over the creation of something whose features - and the comple- 
65. See SanfordJ. Grossman 8c Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691, 697-700 (1986); Hart & 
Moore, Property Rights, supra note 62, at 1121-24. 
66. The renegotiation models that theorists have developed have the following key 
assumptions: Parties' efforts (i.e., investment decisions) are noncontractible ex ante, but 
after uncertainty is resolved efforts are contractible ex post. That means that ex post there 
will be a renegotiation and (following Coase) the parties will allocate decision rights 
efficiently. The theorists' answer to the ex post hold-up problem is to allocate decision 
rights and control ex ante so as to give the bargaining power in the ex post renegotiation 
to the investing party. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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mentarities between those features and their own (changing) interests - 
emerge only through many iterations between them. When it is unclear 
at the time of the formation how large the contractual investments 
should be, and which party should make them and how gains should be 
shared, it is plainly impossible to mitigate the risk of ex post strategic 
behavior by regulating renegotiation in the familiar ways.67 
In response to these limitations, George Baker, Robert Gibbons, and 
Kevin Murphy have developed a model that realistically assumes that deci- 
sion rights often are not contractible x post, so that neither renegoti- 
ation to the efficient outcome nor the allocation of decision rights 
through options is possible. In this environment, he formal contract dic- 
tates a governance structure that motivates self-enforcing informal adjust- 
ments.68 The optimal governance structure is achieved in this model by 
the ex ante contractual allocation - often in the form of an option - of ex 
post decision rights to the party who, because of informal constraints, has 
the least incentive to behave opportunistically. As one of us put it some 
time ago, "the goal is to shift he discretion to the party whose misuse of it 
can be most easily constrained,"69 rather than to specify the appropriate 
adjustment. For example, in venture capital contracting, the decision 
whether to continue a project is shifted to the venture capitalist hrough 
staged financing because his decision, unlike that of the entrepreneur, is 
policed by an effective reputation market.70 
But while ex ante assignment of ex post decision rights via an option 
can address the governance problem where the option holder is con- 
strained by informal mechanisms (as well as by contractually determined 
"prices"), an option approach has important limits. When the parties 
must adapt continuously, uncertainty about which party's opportunism 
needs to be constrained, and a consequent inability to predict the deci- 
sions that actually will have to be made, imply that options are not a feasi- 
67. The problem faced by parties to collaborative contracting is similar to the 
problem faced by parties to preliminary agreements: They also function in a complex 
environment in which a profitable project can take a number of forms and just what form 
will work, if any, is unknown at the start. In the preliminary agreement context, 
simultaneous investment by both parties makes a project sufficiently tangible to support a 
complete contract. But during the investment period, there is a perverse incentive to 
behave opportunistically b delaying a promised investment. Contemporary law can best 
solve this problem by characterizing that defection as a breach and protecting the 
promisee's reliance expenditures. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual 
Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 685-91 (2007). 
68. George Baker et al., Contracting for Control 2-7 (Mar. 21, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://www.law.columbia. 
edu/null/Contracts+Conf+-+April+7-8,+2006+-+Paper+-+Gibbons?exclusive=filemgr.down 
load&file_id=961 193&showthumb=0. 
69. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the 
American Experience, 55 Stan. L Rev. 1067, 1081 (2003) [hereinafter Gilson, Venture 
Capital] . 
70. Id. at 1086. 
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ble technique for assuring efficient adaptation.71 This setting, which de- 
scribes the transactional environment in many of the new collaborative 
arrangements, requires instead a formal governance mechanism that 
stimulates the development of stable cooperative equilibria to support in- 
formal, relational contracting. 
In Part IV, we show that these insights offer valuable tools for ex- 
plaining the contractual patterns that we observe in a small number of co- 
design contracts. Before doing so, however, we turn in Part III to a more 
detailed description of three contracts for innovation that guide our 
analysis. 
III. Three Contract Exemplars 
Our development of a theory of contractual collaboration and co- 
design in Part IV uses three real-life transactional exemplars.72 The con- 
tracts were chosen to illustrate a continuum of circumstances involving 
collaborative innovation across organizational boundaries. Despite varia- 
tions owing to the particular transaction, our exemplars demonstrate sur- 
prising consistency of core features across industry settings. One (the 
Deere-Stanadyne contract) helps establish and maintain a long-term sup- 
ply arrangement but does not obligate either party to supply or to 
purchase anything; the parties perform under the contract without any 
formally enforceable obligations. A second contract (the Apple-SCI con- 
tract) involves two clearly specified and legally enforceable obligations - 
to continue to manufacture and supply a product for a specified term 
(following a purchase of the manufacturing plant from the seller of the 
product) - and two unspecified and legally unenforceable obligations - 
to collaborate on continual improvements in the product and to supply it 
beyond the specified term. The third (the Warner-Lambert-Ligand con- 
tract) involves collaboration in the creation of a single class of pharma- 
71. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy solve part of this problem by assuming that there is 
no transaction-specific investment, see Baker et al., supra note 68, at 17, which eliminates 
the ex ante-ex post tension. As we will see, collaborative innovation does require specific 
investment, though of a different kind than usually assumed in the contract theory 
literature and, we think, in the circumstances that Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy actually 
have in mind. Our analysis here generalizes the Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy approach to 
encompass the type of transaction-specific investment inherent in collaborative innovation 
settings. 
72. The contracts were obtained from one of two sources of contracts available on the 
Internet: onecle.com (http://www.onecle.com) and the Contracting and Organizations 
Research Institute (http://cori.missouri.edu). These organizations, in turn, obtain most 
of their contracts from SEC filings in the SEC's EDGAR database. Firms with a class of 
security registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are required to file with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission copies of their material contracts as exhibits to their 
periodic reports. These exhibits are accessible over the Internet through the SEC's 
EDGAR database. It is commonplace for certain provisions in a contract o be redacted 
prior to being added to the public database pursuant to a company's request for 
confidentiality. 
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ceutical products, which would then be guided through the process of 
regulatory approval and commercialized by only one of the parties. 
We use the analysis of these three contracts to develop, in Part IV, a 
working theory (or extended hypothesis) to explain the contractual gov- 
ernance mechanisms we observe. In subsequent work, we will test our 
theoretical predictions against a larger group of contracts that support 
collaborative innovation. We stress that we use these three contracts prin- 
cipally as exemplars in developing our theory; we simply do not know yet 
the extent to which they generalize to other collaborative ventures. What 
we do know is that the key features of the contracts we highlight are not 
captured by the literature discussed above. If contract is substituting for 
organization in the vertical disintegration of the supply chain, current 
contract theory does not explain the resulting arrangement. 
A final point of caution about generalizing from a very small number 
of contracts: We have no reason to believe that individual lawyers and 
clients negotiating and writing individual contracts will craft he efficient 
structure every time - even in competitive markets, efficiency constraints 
are simply not that binding.73 Each contract will contain singularities; 
some may include mistakes. Mindful of this, we examine only central or 
exemplary features in the documents, and we connect these to suggest 
how, taken together, they respond to the contracting problem under dis- 
cussion. Put differently, the aim is to stylize what appear to us to be the 
parties' intuitions and experience about what works, so that we can later 
assemble a larger group of contracts to assess whether we have correctly 
identified the mechanisms underpinning their success. 
A. The Deere-Stanadyne Agreement 
The Deere-Stanadyne agreement covers two very different functions: 
the supply and purchase of parts for Deere 's existing products, and the 
collaborative process of developing new products as technology and the 
market for Deere's products evolve. The bulk of the formal contract con- 
cerns parts for Deere's current products. However, what is in many ways 
the commercially more important part of the arrangement concerns as- 
yet-unidentified future products and is established by indirection rather 
than by explicit provisions. This part of the agreement provides the key 
to understanding the structure of the relationship between the parties. 
Deere manufactures and sells "machinery and equipment used in ag- 
riculture, construction, and commercial-residential lawn-garden care."74 
Stanadyne "owns and operates design and manufacturing facilities for 
73. As Goldberg and Erickson observed in another context, "The contract erms meet 
only the weak test of birth, not the stronger test of survival." Victor P. Goldberg & John R. 
Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of 
Petroleum Coke, 30 J.L. 8c Econ. 369, 371 (1987). 
74. Deere & Co. & Stanadyne Corp., Long Term Agreement art. I (A) (Nov. 1, 2001) 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Deere-Stanadyne Agreement]. 
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precision engine components including injection equipment."75 Most of 
the agreement addresses Stanadyne's provision of parts listed in an ap- 
pendix to the agreement (that was not available to us); other parts could 
be added by mutual written consent. Since Deere 's product line would 
change over the five years, it was inevitable that its parts requirements 
would change as well. The new parts would be co-developed by the par- 
ties, although the contract says nothing of that. 
Interestingly, the bulk of the formal contract, while focusing on the 
provision of specified parts for Deere's existing products, is not legally 
enforceable because it did not actually require the parties to do anything. 
Although the contract does refer to anticipated levels of Deere purchases, 
Stanadyne did not have to produce any parts, and, if it did produce them, 
Deere was under no obligation to take them (unless Deere issued a 
purchase order) . The parties could easily have written a plainly enforcea- 
ble supply contract. The parsimonious conclusion is that they chose to 
avoid legally enforceable commitments, not that they were creating an 
opportunity to convince a court to disregard the contract's language. 
Conversely, there is no question that orders actually placed by Deere were 
enforceable at specified prices and subject to a sharing arrangement for 
cost savings achieved with respect to designated products.76 
This brings us to the matter of central concern. A substantial frac- 
tion of the parts specified in 2001 would be supplanted during the five- 
year life of the contract and thereafter.77 The written agreement gives 
Stanadyne very little comfort with regard to new parts. Stanadyne can 
coordinate with Deere in devising the parts and controlling their costs. 
However, the agreement explicitly disavows any obligation on the part of 
Deere to develop parts with or purchase parts from Stanadyne. Deere's 
only obligation is to negotiate in good faith, and that obligation is limited 
by a broad "meeting competition" clause that gives Deere virtually com- 
plete discretion.78 
The written agreement, therefore, does not commit either party with 
respect to the development of new products within the existing five-year 
term, or thereafter. Yet the success of the supply relationship and of both 
parties' businesses depend on continued innovations in Deere's products 
and therefore in the parts produced by Stanadyne. And precisely because 
the parties could not specify what innovations would be necessary or feasi- 
75. Id. art. I(B). 
76. Article Vili (D) provides, "If STANADYNE CORPORATION is in compliance with 
Section V [N.B. Section V obligates Stanadyne to participate in the Achieving Excellence 
program described infra], all SD Program reductions realized will be shared equally 
between DEERE and STANADYNE CORPORATION." Id. art. VIII(D). "If DEERE 
determines that STANADYNE CORPORATION is not globally competitive and therefore 
not in compliance with Section V, however, STANADYNE CORPORATION agrees to pass 
100% of cost reductions realized to DEERE until such time as thev are in compliance." Id. 
77. The agreement was a follow-on that extended a previous five-year contract for an 
additional five years. 
78. See supra note 76 (setting out text of relevant contract provision). 
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ble, or could be produced at a cost-effective price, something other than 
a state-contingent contract had to govern the parties' ongoing response 
to uncertainty. Understanding that, it becomes clear that the more sig- 
nificant element of the arrangement is a Deere program for supplier rela- 
tionships - "Achieving Excellence" - that is identified but not explained 
in the contract.79 
The Achieving Excellence program, established in 1991, has three 
interrelated components: (a) measuring and monitoring performance; 
(b) providing and transmitting information about the character of the 
parties; and (c) combining (a) and (b) as the parties learn about both 
product development and each other over time. The program sets up a 
hierarchy of suppliers, ranging from "Conditional" at the bottom to 
"Partner" at the top. A Partner is defined as a "supplier who exceeds our 
performance standards, has reached world-class levels, and has a high im- 
pact on the satisfaction level of our customers."80 If a supplier maintains 
Partner status five years in a row, it goes into the Deere Hall of Fame. In 
2006, for example, twenty-one suppliers achieved Hall of Fame status.81 
Suppliers are judged in five categories: quality, delivery, technical sup- 
port, cost management, and wavelength. The first four are self-explana- 
tory. The last, wavelength, purports to capture the supplier's ability to 
manage the human underpinnings of collaboration with Deere. It is a 
composite of initiative, attitude, responsiveness, attention to detail, com- 
munication, and safety performance.82 Under the program, the suppli- 
ers' performance is evaluated on a semi-annual basis by Deere evaluation 
teams whose composition - including representatives from all plants sup- 
plied and various corporate functions - reflects and balances Deere' s dif- 
ferent interests in its supply base, and thus helps protect both supplier 
and customer against partial judgments. 
This arrangement suggests why the legal unenforceability of the 
agreement is of little importance to the parties. External verification of 
the facts surrounding a supplier's collaboration with Deere in developing 
new products through the legal process would be extremely difficult. 
Whether, for example, the supplier acted in good faith in refusing or 
failing to develop and produce a specific product is difficult for a court to 
determine, especially because, for reasons discussed above, both parties 
are prone to opportunistic behavior during judicial factfinding. In con- 
trast, Deere' s Achieving Excellence program is a governance mechanism 
79. The supplier agrees only to participate (but given the absence of any 
consequences, the commitment is not enforceable): "STANADYNE CORPORATION will 
strive to meet or exceed all DEERE 'Achieving Excellence' (or 'AE') requirements to reach 
and maintain 'Partner' status." Deere-Stanadyne Agreement, supra note 74, art. V. 
80. Deere & Co., Achieving Excellence Indirect Materials & Services 8, at https:// 
jdsupply.deere.com/business_processes/ae_process/ae_indirect_presentation.pdf (last 
visited Ian. 19, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
81. E.g., Centro, Inc., Awards, at http://www.centroinc.com/awards.htm (las  visited 
Feb. 10, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
82. Deere 8c Co., supra note 80, at 20. 
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that allows Deere to act based only on what its own evaluation teams find 
to be observable, rather than also having to verify those findings to a 
court. Moreover, the wavelength category puts suppliers on notice that 
Deere will take into account a supplier's character, in particular a sup- 
plier's attitudes toward cooperation. 
Furthermore, because assessment of a supplier's capabilities and 
character is based on the actual experience of collaboration, it takes time, 
investing both parties in the relationship. As a supplier moves from 
Conditional supplier to Partner, both Deere and Stanadyne learn more 
about each other's capabilities and character. Replacing a particular sup- 
plier would require that Deere expend time and effort to learn both the 
capabilities and character of a new one. Thus, making an existing rela- 
tionship work is often preferable to incurring the information costs asso- 
ciated with a replacement. And the same kind of considerations will con- 
strain the supplier. Losing Deere as a customer eliminates the value of 
Stanadyne' s investment in teaching Deere about its capabilities and 
character. 
Finally, either party's termination of the relationship potentially re- 
sults in a depreciation of the other party's reputation. Precisely because a 
party's actual performance is neither observable nor verifiable by other 
potential partners, a breakdown in the relationship imposes costs beyond 
the immediate loss of Deere's business or the supplier's product. For 
Stanadyne, termination by Deere would increase the investment a new 
customer would have to make in a relationship with Stanadyne, as the 
potential customer would want to understand why Deere had terminated 
the supplier. And this problem has a symmetric impact on Deere. Poten- 
tial suppliers have to learn that Deere has the capabilities and character 
necessary to warrant the supplier's investment (i.e., that the Achieving 
Excellence program remains credible). Deere's failure to effectively 
manage a prior supply relationship raises questions that a new supplier 
would have to invest in answering.83 
Consistent with the parties' needs to demonstrate their trustworthi- 
ness and to allow each to learn how the other responds to disagreements 
(a characteristic critical to ongoing collaborative innovation), the agree- 
ment establishes a two-step dispute resolution process. First, executives 
from each firm higher up in the management than the disputing manag- 
ers will meet in good faith in an attempt to negotiate a resolution.84 If 
83. See Victor P. Goldberg, A Relational Exchange Perspective on the Employment 
Relationship, in Firms, Organization and Labour: Approaches to the Economics of Work 
Organization 127, 129 (Frank H. Stephen ed., 1984) (discussing impact ex ante of 
imperfect information regarding one's contractual counterparty, specifically impact of 
associated information costs on one's willingness to enter into a bargain). 
84. The contract provides, in pertinent part: 
The parties shall attempt in good faith to resolve any controversy, claim or 
dispute of whatever nature arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the 
breach, termination, enforceability or validity thereof (a "DISPUTE") promptly 
by negotiation between executives or managers who have authority to settle the 
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that fails, the dispute will go to arbitrators using Illinois law and the Rules 
of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce. 
Thus, in the contracts between Deere and its suppliers, the nature of 
the parts to be produced and the technology for producing them 
changes over the course of the agreement in response to changes in the 
marketplace. Deere's products and the parts provided by suppliers co- 
evolve as the interplay between Deere and its suppliers produces new in- 
formation. Deere and its suppliers rely upon an external, preexisting, 
informal governance mechanism over the course of their relationship to 
govern the innovative portion of the supply relationship, and an explicit, 
legally enforceable contract to govern the actual provision of specific 
parts. 
B. The Apple-SCI Agreement 
Compared to the Deere-Stanadyne agreement, the Apple-SCI 
agreement represents a movement oward legal enforceability. Because 
the Apple-SCI arrangement appears to cover two conceptually separate 
but related transactions - a one-time sale of a manufacturing facility and 
an ongoing commitment o collaborative innovation in connection with 
the manufacture and assembly of Apple computers - we see two different 
approaches to dealing with the challenge of dividing gains. The agree- 
ment has explicit, enforceable contract terms to support the one-time 
sale, but the commitment to collaborative innovation is protected by im- 
plicit, unenforceable terms. 
In 1996, Apple sold its Fountain, Colorado manufacturing plant to 
SCI and simultaneously entered into a three-year contract o purchase a 
substantial share of its logic boards and personal computers from that 
plant. The transactions were one element in Apple's strategic decision to 
rely more on outsourcing. SCI was, at the time, the largest contract man- 
ufacturer, with sales of around four billion dollars, twenty plants in eight 
countries, over fifteen thousand employees, and over fifty customers, in- 
cluding Hewlett Packard and IBM.85 
The contract itself is fairly straightforward. For an initial three-year 
term, Apple promised to purchase at least a specified percentage of its 
logic boards and computers from SCI. Rather than committing to 
purchase a specific number of units, Apple's commitment was a function 
of its total purchases; that is, it agreed to buy a specified fraction of its 
main logic boards and computer systems in each of the three years. For 
the former, the commitment for the three years was 60/50/40; for the 
DISPUTE, and who are at a higher level of management than the persons who 
have direct responsibility for the administration of this Agreement. 
Deere-Stanadyne Agreement, supra note 74, art. XXH(G)(1). 
85. Timothy J. Sturgeon, Turnkey Production: The Organizational Delinking of 
Production from Innovation, in New Product Development and Production Networks 67, 
73-74 (Ulrich Jürges ed., 2000). 
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latter, it was 40/40/30. While the contract could be extended on a year- 
by-year basis, Apple made no purchase commitment after year three. 
The sale was said to have been triggered by Apple's inability to meet 
a surge in demand from its own plants.86 The terms of the contract seem 
to have given Apple significant flexibility.87 The formulation of its 
purchase obligation in relative terms shifted the risk of demand fluctua- 
tion to SCI.88 To some extent, this flexibility stands the traditional logic 
of industrial organization on its head, since we would normally expect to 
see a greater likelihood of vertical integration by ownership when the 
possibility of shortages would make the firm subject to the threat of hold- 
up. In the case of the contract manufacturing sector, however, the ability 
to respond quickly to demand fluctuations - to bear the risk of either 
over or under capacity - is central to the package that is offered to cus- 
tomers. Thus, to the extent that explicit legal remedies are insufficient o 
constrain an SCI hold-up in the first three years, and with respect to any 
supply beginning in year four, the risk of hold-up must be constrained by 
something other than explicit contract.89 
For at least the three-year initial term, the explicit portion of the 
Apple-SCI contract looks like a straightforward supply agreement, albeit 
with a formulation that shifts much of the risk of demand fluctuation to 
the contract manufacturer. This element of the agreement seems to pro- 
tect SCFs purchase of the manufacturing plant from Apple: For the first 
three years, Apple will provide sufficient volume to make the plant acqui- 
86. Timothy J. Sturgeon, Turnkey Production Networks: A New American Model of 
Industrial Organization? 9-10 & n.4 (Berkeley Roundtable on the Int'l Econ., Working 
Paper No. 92A, 1997), available at http://brie.berkeley.edu/publications/wp%2092A.pdf 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) . 
87. Within the constraints of the percentage volume commitment, Apple had 
considerable flexibility to respond to market conditions. Apple would provide, on a 
monthly basis, nonbinding forecasts covering the following six months and issue monthly 
purchase orders on a rolling four-month basis. Apple could increase or decrease the 
quantity without penalty if it gave satisfactory advance notice. If Apple required greater 
flexibility, then it would be responsible for any overtime charges and vendor premiums. 
Apple could cancel any purchase order with thirty days notice provided that it reimburses 
SCI for costs reasonably incurred. Additionally, the percentage volume commitment i self 
provided flexibility to Apple to respond to market movements through a make-up clause. 
If Apple fell below its commitment in the first wo years, it could either add the shortfall to 
its commitment for the third year or pay SCI the profit it would have earned on the 
shortfall. 
88. Because Apple committed only to a specified share of its purchases, SCI bore the 
risk that reduced demand (for Apple computers or industry-wide) would result in an 
absolute decline in Apple's purchases from SCI, while increased demand would commit 
SCI to provide additional product, even though in both cases SCI' s share of Apple's 
purchases would not change. 
89. As discussed supra, Apple has multiple sources for the products it is purchasing 
from SCI; that is, Apple will be getting sixty percent of its computers from suppliers other 
than SCI. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86. Multi-sourcing provides some 
protection against SCI-specific opportunism, but when hold-up is made possible by 
industry-wide short supply there is no reason not to expect other suppliers to behave just as 
would SCI. 
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sition viable. For our purposes, however, the more interesting part of the 
contract is a second set of obligations concerning co-design of the actual 
products to be supplied. 
Technological change in the computer industry is rapid, and, as 
noted, the contract is for products not yet known. In the agreement, 
Apple commited to purchase circuit boards and personal computers, but 
the specifications for those products are not set out in the contract. 
Thus, Apple and SCI had to collaborate in defining the performance 
characteristics ofthe products to be manufactured by SCI, and in setting 
the price to be paid. 
Understanding that, the centerpiece of the contract was the parties' 
agreement to establish "product plans."90 SCI promised to produce, and 
Apple promised to purchase, something over the three-year term, but the 
details would be determined collaboratively over the performance pe- 
riod. Apple would provide the first product plan, less than a month into 
the agreement. Since the first plan likely would largely reflect Apple's 
existing specifications, little collaboration was necessary. In contrast, sub- 
sequent plans, which would have to both anticipate and respond to tech- 
nology changes, would be prepared collaboratively. In addition to pro- 
viding a pricing formula for the products, the plans would specify 
preproduction services including development of assembly and test 
processes; development of test programs and/or fixtures; and production 
of prototype and/or validation units. The plan would also include a 
preproduction delivery and payment schedule. SCI would appoint a test 
engineer to work with Apple's test engineers and, if necessary, co-locate 
that engineer at Apple's facilities. SCI would regularly report to Apple 
and make its facilities available to Apple for inspection on reasonable no- 
tice. After a successful preproduction review, Apple would give SCI the 
go-ahead to begin production.91 SCI would then produce on a "turnkey" 
basis in accordance with Apple's specifications and quality 
requirements.92 
The process is not necessarily completed when Apple approves the 
specifications. Once production has begun, one or the other party might 
find a possible improvement. If SCI wants to change a component, mate- 
rial, or process it must obtain Apple's written consent. A consent request 
must include information on any cost, scheduling, and other impacts of 
the change, and Apple could require sample units. Adoption of the 
change would be solely at Apple's discretion. If Apple desired a modifica- 
tion in the design, it would have to submit an "engineering change or- 
der." Within a week, SCI would have to advise Apple on the cost or other 
90. Apple Computer, Inc. & SCI Systems, Inc., Foundation Manufacturing Agreement 
art. 4 (May 31, 1996) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Apple-SCI 
Agreement] . 
91. Id. art. 5.6. 
92. Id. art. 6. 
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impacts of the change. Again, adoption of the change would be solely at 
Apple's discretion. 
The details on pricing are in an exhibit not included with the con- 
tract, but the basic outlines are clear. For each new product, SCI pro- 
poses a price quote; the formula takes into account a number of cost 
factors, but the basic agreement does not say how these are to be 
weighted. On procured material, SCI passes through any cost reductions 
including rebates and discounts. Failure to do so constitutes a material 
breach and is grounds for immediate termination, except if the failures 
are de minimis or accidental and are promptly remedied, with interest. 
While such a response appears at first o be overkill, SCFs behavior on 
this verifiable fact could be a plausible proxy for SCFs commitment not 
to behave opportunistically.93 Importantly, the pricing provisions can 
function as no more than a focal point for bargaining, since they are of 
significance only after an agreement is reached over the product plan. 
Thus, the collaboration that leads up to determining the innovations that 
will be incorporated in the project allows hard bargaining over pricing 
despite the contractual pricing formula. 
Thus, at the core of the Apple-SCI agreement is a process of collabo- 
rative co-design, in which the parties iteratively determine the feasibility 
of innovations suggested by both parties. The three-year term, during 
which Apple commits to purchase from SCI in order to support the sale 
of the manufacturing plant, facilitates the development of valuable infor- 
mation. As the products actually being produced over the three-year pe- 
riod reflect less and less Apple's pre-contract products and more and 
more the product of the collaborative ffort, joint development of cumu- 
lative changes in product plans generates ever-increasing knowledge 
about each party's capacity for collaborative innovation and for good 
faith dispute resolution. Then, at the end of the three-year commitment, 
93. During the three-year term, the contract also contains two significant explicit 
remedies covering situations that presented a serious risk to Apple and that could arise 
before switching costs had risen sufficiently to discourage opportunistic behavior. First, 
the pricing is subject to a significant condition regarding quality: 
This Agreement and the Pricing Schedules are based on the assumption that SCI 
can produce the Products at quality levels suitable for shipment directly to 
Apple's distribution system. SCI's inability to achieve certification status as 
defined in Exhibit E, will create a significant increase in costs to Apple. SCI will 
develop a plan to meet such requirements and understands that failure to achieve 
certification status within a reasonable time frame may result in disqualification as 
an approved Apple supplier. 
Id. art. 9.3. While the consequences of a failure to achieve certification or the loss of the 
approved supplier label are not spelled out, they appear to be serious, presumably 
relieving Apple of future purchase obligations. Second, the collaborative process will give 
SCI information about Apple's future plans, information that might be valuable to Apple's 
competitors. The contractual response to SCI misbehavior concerning Apple's 
competitively sensitive data is draconiani "Apple may terminate this Agreement effective 
immediately upon written notice to SCI if SCI materially breaches its obligation of 
confidentiality." Id. art. 18.1 (b). 
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the contract no longer binds either party; it leaves the parties free to go 
forward, unconstrained by the detailed terms of the contract. 
Importantly, the Apple-SCI contract differs from the 
Deere-Stanadyne contract in that both Apple and SCI understand that 
Apple will have other suppliers providing precisely the products that SCI 
is providing. Thus, building an informal enforcement mechanism is 
more difficult: The costs of finding and learning about replacement sup- 
pliers are lower because Apple already has this information about its par- 
allel suppliers. In order to understand how the Apple-SCI arrangement 
operates, therefore, we have to distinguish between manufacturing on 
the one hand, and collaborative innovation on the other. To the extent 
that a manufacturer isonly a specifications taker - that is, it manufactures 
to the specifications Apple develops with its collaborative manufactur- 
ers - multiple suppliers pose a risk that Apple will switch from one 
noncollaborative supplier to others. To the collaborative manufacturers, 
in contrast, the fact of multiple suppliers may not create the same risk. 
Apple needs to learn about a new supplier's capacity to make a contribu- 
tion. To be sure, they can switch production to one of their other suppli- 
ers, but there are two frictions. First, some of the suppliers may be just 
manufacturers and not good at iterative collaboration. Switching more 
production to them without finding another supplier who can contribute 
to innovation leaves Apple worse off. Alternatively, suppose all suppliers 
help innovate but come up with different insights, the best of which 
Apple builds into the specifications for all manufacturers. Then Apple is 
choosing how many suppliers to have; a reduction in the optimum num- 
ber of collaborative innovators is a cost to Apple of cheating. 
C. The Warner-Lambert-Ligand Agreement 
The development of new drugs based on biotechnology often entails 
contracting across organizational boundaries.94 Large pharmaceutical 
companies frequently lack the depth of scientific knowledge and experi- 
ence that provide the foundation for biotech research. Smaller biotech 
firms typically lack the experience and capital to both take the drugs 
through the arduous process of obtaining FDA approval and commer- 
cially market he drug.95 Firms engage in a broad range of collaborative 
arrangements including joint ventures, licensing agreements, and co-de- 
94. For example, Robinson and Stuart report that some twenty-five percent of the 
twenty-six billion dollars of industry-financed (as opposed to university-financed or 
nonprofit-financed) pharmaceutical research and development was done in collaborative 
agreements between separate entities. David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Financial 
Contracting in Biotech Strategic Alliances, 50 J.L. & Econ. 559, 559 (2007) [hereinafter 
Robinson & Stuart, Financial Contracting]. 
95. Cf. id. at 563-64 (detailing high costs associated with pharmaceutical regulatory 
approval and marketing). 
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velopment deals.96 We focus here on a particular contract (the "Warner- 
Lambert-Ligand agreement"):97 a research, development, and license 
agreement between Warner-Lambert, a large pharmaceutical company, 
and Ligand Pharmaceuticals, a much smaller biotech company, to dis- 
cover and/or design small-molecule compounds that act through the es- 
trogen receptors, to develop those compounds into pharmaceutical prod- 
ucts, and to take those products through the FDA approval process and 
through commercialization. 
A brief description of the drug development process provides a con- 
text for the Warner-Lambert-Ligand agreement.98 The initial screening 
of compounds and preclinical work takes, on average, three to six years. 
During that period, the number of compounds under consideration is 
winnowed from 5,000-10,000 down to a quite small number through sci- 
entific and animal testing. At that point, an application for an 
Investigational New Drug is filed with the FDA. If the FDA approves, the 
drug can move to clinical testing on humans. Clinical testing takes an- 
other six to seven years. That period is broken down into three phases: 
Phase one tests include fewer than 100 persons, phase two between 100 
and 500, and phase three between 1,000 and 5,000. If the drug sur- 
mounts these hurdles, the sponsoring company submits a New Drug 
Application (NDA) with supporting documentation. FDA review of the 
NDA can take another six months to two years. If the FDA approves, the 
drug can be brought to market. Estimates are that out of 5,000 to 10,000 
compounds, only 250 enter preclinical testing,99 and only about twenty 
percent of drugs that begin phase one testing are ultimately approved by 
the FDA.100 Only upon approval does the pharmaceutical company dis- 
cover whether the drug will be successful commercially. 
In the research stage of the project, the Warner-Lambert-Ligand 
agreement stipulates that Ligand will engage in directed research, with 
Warner-Lambert providing the bulk of the funding. In this phase, 
Warner-Lambert monitors the work and has options to abandon in the 
event that the research proves unpromising. If the project ultimately suc- 
96. See, e.g., Leslie Gladstone Restaino, BioPharma Collaborative Agreements: 
Choosing the Right Deal Structure, Metropolitan Corp. Couns., Nov. 2007, at 47, available 
at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2007/November/47.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (discussing history and types of collaborative arrangements) . 
97. We will also draw upon Ligand's contract of May 19, 2000 with Bristol-Myers 
Squibb to discover small-molecule compounds which act as modulators of the 
mineralocortoid receptor. 
98. Because of the regulatory structure, the components of the process are 
standardized. This description of the drug-development process is based on 
Innovation.org, Drug Discovery and Development (2007), at http://www.innovation.org/ 
drug_discovery/ objects/ pdf/RD_Brochure. pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
99. Nat'l Inst, of Health, Dep't of Health and Human Servs., A Plan to Ensure 
Taxpayers' Interests Are Protected (2001), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/070101 
wyden.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
100. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Evidence of Drug 
Development Costs, 22 J. Health Econ. 151, 165 (2003). 
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ceeds, only a small fraction of the costs would be associated with the re- 
search phase. The major costs of bringing a drug to market are incurred 
in the later stages, in which the manufacturer must prove efficacy and 
safety through clinical studies in the FDA approval process.101 Once a 
successful compound has been identified, Ligand's role is largely over, 
and, as a result, its role in decisionmaking largely disappears. Most deci- 
sions in this phase are at the "sole discretion" of Warner-Lambert.102 
The research stage is divided into three periods, with Warner- 
Lambert having an option to abandon in the first wo. The Exploratory 
phase lasts fifteen months, after which the project terminates unless 
Warner-Lambert gives at least one month's written otice of its intention 
to enter into the second phase, the Extension term. The Extension term 
is three years. Funding levels for both periods are specified in dollars per 
Full-Time Equivalent (FTE).10S 
During the research stage, the parties' collaboration is centered on a 
Joint Research Committee (JRC), an elaborate governance structure re- 
sponsible for reviewing and directing all scientific activities in the preclin- 
ical period. In effect, the JRC determines the research path. The com- 
101. A growing literature concerning strategic alliances emphasizes three different 
elements: (1) the role of strategic alliances as an alternative financing vehicle to venture 
capital; (2) the role of networks in developing reputations that help support strategic 
alliances, and (3) the choice of a strategic alliance through which to carry on an activity as 
opposed to undertaking the activity within the existing entity. See, e.g., Robinson 8c Stuart, 
Financial Contracting, supra note 94, at 561-62 (comparing strategic alliances with 
venture capital arrangements) ; David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Network Effects in the 
Governance of Strategic Alliances, 23 J.L. Econ. 8c Org. 242, 243 (2007) [hereinafter 
Robinson 8c Stuart, Network Effects] (arguing that "the stock of past alliances gives rise to a 
communication network that affects the allocation of control in strategic alliance 
agreements by allowing long-term reputational concerns to affect the terms of specific 
contracts"); David T. Robinson, Strategic Alliances and the Boundaries of the Firm, 21 Rev. 
Fin. Stud. 649, 651-52 (2008) (finding that firms prefer strategic alliances to internal 
expansion when new activity pursued is risky and/or unrelated to firm's primary line of 
business). The three categories, however, share one common characteristic: In their 
analysis of the terms of strategic alliances, the need to support the collaborative innovation 
that is at the heart of the substantive transaction is typically ignored. 
102. Warner-Lambert Co. 8c Ligand Pharmaceuticals Inc., Research, Development, 
and License Agreement art. 3.1.1 (Sept. 1, 1999) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
[hereinafter Warner-Lambert-Ligand Agreement]. In addition, Warner-Lambert 
contemporaneously purchased approximately seven percent of Ligand's equity. Thus, the 
contract contained two linked but distinct agreements: one covering the research and 
development of small-molecule compounds that act through the estrogen receptors and 
another covering the financing of the sale of equity in one research partner to another. 
Such equity investments are not uncommon in research-and-development joint ventures. 
See Robinson 8c Stuart, Network Effects, upra note 101, at 242-43. 
103. Warner-Lambert-Ligand Agreement, supra note 102, art. 2.8. "Full-Time 
Equivalent" (FTE) is defined as "one or more researchers with appropriate qualifications 
employed by Ligand or Warner-Lambert and assigned to work on the Collaboration with 
such time and effort o constitute one such researcher working on the Collaboration on a 
full-time basis for no less than *** hours per year." Id. art. 1. Warner-Lambert then has 
the right to add further extension terms. To trigger those extensions, Warner-Lambert has 
to provide written otice and a financial commitment to support a certain level of activity. 
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mittee consists of three members from each firm, and all decisions must 
be unanimous.104 In the event of a disagreement, the dispute goes to 
Ligand's CEO and the president of Warner-Lambert's Pharmaceutical 
Research Division for "good faith resolution" within a specified period.105 
If they fail to resolve the dispute, the parties are free to pursue legal rem- 
edies. As with the other agreements we discuss, the threat to line manag- 
ers of having to explain to senior executives of both companies the fail- 
ure to effectively cooperate likely carries more weight than the threat of 
legal action. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to the JRC collaborative governance struc- 
tures, Warner-Lambert's options to abandon the project are unilateral. If 
the science proves unpromising, it can terminate with little or no direct 
cost. There is an indirect cost, however, in that it agrees not to pursue 
research in the field for a specified period. If Warner-Lambert termi- 
nates after the Extension period, the likelihood that something valuable 
has been produced in the interim will have increased, and the termina- 
tion might be opportunistic. The contract reflects that concern. If 
Warner-Lambert were to conduct independent research on a collabora- 
tive compound in the field and file an Investigational New Drug 
Application within a defined period after termination, it would have to 
pay royalties.106 
As the project moves from the research to the development stage, 
regulatory and market experience become more important. The cost of 
the project, all of which will be borne by Warner-Lambert, also increases 
exponentially. As a result, both responsibility and decisionmaking shift to 
Warner-Lambert: The JRC's role ends with the completion of the re- 
search phase. Under the agreement, the JRC recommends which com- 
pounds to pursue, but the decision to go forward rests in Warner- 
Lambert's sole discretion. Warner-Lambert promises to "use diligent ef- 
forts to pursue the Clinical Development and commercialization of each 
Collaboration Lead Compound at its own expense"; however, it "shall 
have the sole discretion to determine (a) which Products to develop or 
market or to continue to develop or market, (b) which Products to seek 
104. Id. art. 3.1.4. 
105. Id. art. 3.2. 
106. Id. art. 12.3. The termination provisions in the contract are quite complicated. 
Warner-Lambert, as noted in the text, has the option to abandon twice during the research 
term, at the end of the Exploratory and Extension terms. In both instances, the 
background technology would be returned. If Warner-Lambert terminates after the 
Exploratory term, it would grant Ligand an exclusive royalty-free license to use a number 
of compounds of Ligand's choice that have exhibited "field activity." Id. art. 12.2. If 
Warner-Lambert concludes that Ligand's work in the research phase is unsatisfactory, it 
can unilaterally terminate the agreement. In such a case, Warner-Lambert would have 
exclusive rights to develop a certain number of background technology compounds in the 
field, and it could choose which; the rights to the others would revert to Ligand. 
Moreover, if Warner-Lambert were successful, Ligand would be entitled to milestone 
payments and royalties. Id. art. 12.8. 
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regulatory approval for, and (c) when and where and how and on what 
terms and conditions, to market such Products in the Territory."107 
The significant ex ante uncertainty associated with the collaboration 
is reflected in the manner in which Ligand is compensated. As we saw, 
the gap between contract formation and the appearance of a marketable 
drug is likely to be more than a decade.108 So the nature of that drug 
and its potential value (clinically and financially) is unknown at the time 
of contracting. Because of that uncertainty, Ligand's compensation is 
carefully structured. First, as noted, it is to be paid for some fraction 
(perhaps all) of the FTE assigned to the task. Second, it is paid a fixed 
fee upon the initial screening of the Warner-Lambert compound library; 
if Warner-Lambert chooses to go ahead with the Extension term, Ligand 
will receive an additional fixed fee. These could be labeled milestone 
payments, although the contract does not do so. The agreement does 
establish a number of specific milestones, and, upon reaching each mile- 
stone, Ligand will receive an additional payment. Finally, if the research 
produces marketable products, Ligand will receive royalty payments on 
sales. 
The risk of opportunistic behavior by Warner-Lambert is mitigated 
by matching options. Warner-Lambert might decide not to proceed to 
the development stage for a variety of reasons. The most significant is a 
genuine belief that the project will fail to yield a commercially viable out- 
come. Even if Warner-Lambert believes the project viable, it might want 
to defer development in favor of a more promising alternative in another 
field. Or it might act opportunistically, feigning disappointment with the 
intent of renegotiating the financial terms. Which of these alternatives in 
fact motivates Warner-Lambert's decision to abandon might well be diffi- 
cult for Ligand even to observe, let alone to verify. This difficulty is ad- 
dressed by giving Ligand a matching option. If Warner-Lambert decides 
not to proceed with the development of a particular "collaboration lead 
compound," then Ligand has the right to develop and commercialize 
it.109 To decide whether to exercise its option, Ligand would need only 
to be able to assess the commercial viability of the product; realistically, it 
would have to convince a replacement partner of the product's viability. 
Of course, the later in the process Warner-Lambert exercises its option to 
abandon, the more observable should be the product's viability, and the 
more effective Ligand's matching option in deterring opportunism. 
107. Id. art. 4.2. 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100. 
109. Warner-Lambert-Ligand Agreement, supra note 102, art. 5.3.1. Ligand's right is 
qualified; it cannot go forward if Warner-Lambert is commercializing the compound for 
another use or has a competing product (either existing or in the pipeline). 
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IV. A Theory of Contractual Collaboration and Co-design 
As we discussed in Part II, transactions involving collaborative inno- 
vation across organizational boundaries have distinctive features that af- 
fect their contractual structure.110 In particular, the design and specifica- 
tion of product characteristics annot be contracted for ex ante; rather, 
they will result from repeated collaboration by employees of both firms. 
The contracting problem is to craft a structure that (1) induces efficient, 
transaction-specific investment by both parties; (2) establishes a frame- 
work for iterative collaboration and adjustment of the parties' obligations 
under conditions of continuing uncertainty - responding, that is, to coor- 
dination cascades; and (3) limits the risk of opportunism that could un- 
dermine the incentive to make relation-specific investments in the first 
place. Each of our contract exemplars addresses those three aims. 
The three contracts do so by incorporating a mix of formal and in- 
formal contract mechanisms. Successful collaborative innovation re- 
quires ample knowledge of the collaborating parties' capabilities and sub- 
stantial confidence in the parties' future cooperative behavior. Neither 
the knowledge nor the confidence can be acquired or assured by formal 
contract alone. At the same time, the commercial context makes it infea- 
sible to build up both over time through repeated exchanges policed by 
the expectation of future dealings.111 In the arrangements of interest 
here, the innovative product (or products) must be created early in the 
relationship; there is thus no assurance of a number of future rounds 
sufficiently large that the expectation of a long-term relationship and the 
discipline of repeated dealings will protect against opportunistic behav- 
ior.112 Instead, in these contracts, formal contracting operates impor- 
tantly to facilitate the development of informal contracting structures 
that police the parties' expectations of capability, cooperation, and 
trust.113 
110. See supra Part ILA. 
111. See generally Avinash K. Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes 
of Governance 14-21 (2004) (outlining theory of repeated games in which "the prospect 
that future benefits depend on current performance may suffice to induce" contractual 
parties to behave cooperatively). 
112. The theorem of repeated dealings underlying this conclusion is the "folk 
theorem" of noncooperative game theory. See generally id. at 61 (noting that certain 
models of repeated games with imperfect monitoring are limited in practical applicability 
because of their "folk theorem" focus on the "limiting case where . . . players are extremely 
patient"); Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with 
Discounting or with Incomplete Information, 54 Econometrica 533, 536-39 (1986) 
(outlining "the classical folk theorem"). 
113. Laura Poppo and Todd Zenger raise the potential for this interactive relation 
between formal and informal contracting but base their analysis on interviews with 
executives involved in the contracting process rather than on assessments of the actual 
contractual techniques that create and sustain the relationship. See Laura Poppo 8c Todd 
Zenger, Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or 
Complements?, 23 Strategic Mgmt. J. 707, 712-15, 721 (2002). Thus, our focus here on 
actual contracts and contracting techniques extends their insightful intuition. 
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Such mechanisms would be unnecessary if we assumed that these 
new collaborative arrangements operated in a contractual state of nature, 
in which good faith cooperation could be expected from an arm's length 
partner despite the absence of effective enforcement and despite the par- 
ties' inability to specify the substance of their joint efforts. We make no 
such assumption. Rather, as we explain more fully in Part IV.C, process- 
oriented, formal contracting supports the rapid development of informal 
contracting techniques that address, in turn, the substantive elements of 
the parties' performance. In the end, the same parties that must cooper- 
ate to create the innovation also must bargain noncooperatively over how 
the gains created by that innovation are shared, and, in some - perhaps 
many - cases, the collaborative ffort will be less successful than antici- 
pated. The delay of delivery of the Boeing 787 because of slow perform- 
ance by some suppliers is a stark, current example.114 Thus, cooperation 
does not eliminate tension or conflict;115 the package of interrelated for- 
mal and informal contractual techniques described below allows the co- 
operation necessary for iterative collaborative innovation while also al- 
lowing the parties to accommodate their conflicting interests in division 
of joint gains. 
In the discussion that follows, we set out a theory that seeks to ex- 
plain how the exemplar contracts we study are structured so as to support 
collaborative contracting. We begin in Part IVA by describing the trans- 
actional variations in our exemplar contracts, focusing primarily on 
whether the intended collaboration is long-term or of a relatively discrete 
duration. Despite these variations, the analysis in Part IV.B identifies a
key similarity: Each contract creates a governance mechanism that is 
structured to produce information about the parties' capabilities to inno- 
vate and their capacities to cooperate. In Part IV.C, we describe the key 
enforcement mechanisms that result from this governance structure: a
rich braiding of formal and informal terms that deters opportunism dur- 
ing the collaborative/learning phase of the contract and a series of 
nested options that applies once the parties reach an end stage in their 
collaboration. 
A. Transactional Variations in Collaborative Contract Design 
The characteristic differences in the new contractual patterns we ob- 
serve are driven by the nature of the barriers to ex post opportunism, 
which in turn are dictated by the substance of the transaction. The struc- 
ture of contracts for collaborative innovation differ most importantly de- 
pending on whether the contemplated collaboration is long-term - in- 
volving an ongoing stream of interactive innovations - or whether it 
114. See, e.g., Boeing Announces Another 787 Delay, L.A. Times, Apr. 10, 2008, at 
C6. 
115. Alan O'Sullivan details the wide range of conflict that is possible even in a 
successful collaborative contract for innovation. See O'Sullivan, supra note 51, at 236-44. 
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involves a discrete project aimed at producing a single innovation such as 
a patentable product or process. As we will see, in the former case the 
barrier to ex post opportunism arises from the collaboration process it- 
self: The continued presence of uncertainty makes impossible the ex 
ante allocation of ex post decision power through assigning to one party 
options to take action like termination. In the discrete project setting, 
informal mechanisms operating during the collaborative period discour- 
age opportunism - in particular, the appropriation of jointly produced 
information for private purposes - but the parties have to fear opportu- 
nistic renegotiation once the cooperative stage of the project is com- 
pleted. The only issue then remaining is division of the gains from prior 
cooperation. As a result, an explicit constraint on opportunism must be 
employed, but, at this stage, the uncertainty having been resolved, the 
contract theory solution of allocating decisionmaking rights is feasible. 
At one end of the spectrum is contracting for long-term collaborative 
innovation, particularly well illustrated by the Deere-Stanadyne agree- 
ment,116 which is almost entirely focused on building knowledge of 
Stanadyne's capabilities as a collaborator in future innovation. To be 
sure, the agreement provides the terms of actual purchases, should Deere 
in fact make them, but the agreement itself does not commit Deere to 
purchase anything at all. Instead, the bulk of the work is done by non- 
contractual programs that create settings for Stanadyne and other suppli- 
ers to demonstrate their capacity for collaboration over time by ascending 
the ranks of favored suppliers. The agreement plainly contemplates a 
long-term relationship between Deere and Stanadyne, despite the impos- 
sibility of specifying what products will turn out to be needed in the face 
of the uncertain future of Deere's market. As each party learns about the 
other's capabilities and character, the costs of extracting private benefits 
at the risk of undermining collective gains continue to rise. 
The Apple-SCI agreement presents a mixed case between an ex- 
plicit, three-year supply contract and an implicit, long-term contract that 
contemplates collaborative innovation.117 Recall that in this agreement 
the three-year, explicit supply arrangement supported Apple's sale to SCI 
of Apple's manufacturing plant.1 18 In the short run, the product that SCI 
would manufacture for Apple was fully specified: The agreement con- 
templated a turnkey sale to SCI with SCI immediately charged with pro- 
ducing sixty percent of Apple's requirements for precisely the same com- 
puters Apple produced at the same plant until the sale. However, that 
product would evolve over time in step with changes in markets and tech- 
nology, with the differences from the original specifications accumulat- 
ing. The agreement provided an elaborate planning process to ensure 
that the manufacturer and assembler (SCI) and the seller of the product 
(Apple) would jointly address the changes in the manufacturing/ assem- 
116. See supra Part III.A (detailing provisions of Deere-Stanadyne agreement). 
117. See supra Part III.B (detailing provisions of Apple-SCI agreement). 
118. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 18 Dec 2015 17:45:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2009] CONTRACTING FOR INNOVATION 475 
bly process and in the product. The process calls for continued improve- 
ment in performance and cost through collaboration and jointly deter- 
mined benchmarking. 
As Apple's three-year purchase commitment winds down, the explicit 
terms of the contract no longer protect SCI's investment in the plant 
from the threat of termination by Apple. At the same time, Apple's own 
exposure grows as the manufacturing process reflects increasingly more 
input by SCI through the co-design process, and therefore a more and 
more complex bundle of explicit and tacit knowledge. As a result, at one 
time or another, either party may be in a position to extract a larger part 
of the gain from the relationship by threatening to withhold further co- 
operation. While each party makes a front-end specific investment - SCI 
in buying the plant and Apple in agreeing to purchase specific amounts 
of its supplies from SCI and thus relinquishing control over a large part 
of its computer production - these threats may be credible because the 
specific investments are not necessarily symmetric; each party is vulnera- 
ble to hold-up at different times during the collaborative period. 
Thus, a co-design relationship in the prototypical design and adapta- 
tion arrangement has to address the traditional hold-up problem associ- 
ated with specific investment, but must do so in an environment where ex 
post decision rights are not contractible ex ante - the iterative and collab- 
orative process makes it impossible to specify what decisions will need to 
be made. For the project to work, the parties must rely on an informal 
arrangement to constrain opportunistic renegotiation of the division of 
the value created by success during the three-year period of the contract, 
and in setting the terms of the parties' relationship thereafter. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum from long-term collaboration is 
contracting for a discrete project. Discrete-project ontracting contem- 
plates collaboration during the development stage but allows for oppor- 
tunism when the development stage is completed. The Warner- 
Lambert-Ligand agreement provides a good illustration.119 In that 
agreement, the parties contemplate a joint effort o develop pharmaceuti- 
cal products having specified capabilities, with Ligand playing the leading 
role in the research-and-development stage and Warner-Lambert playing 
the primary role in the compounds' commercialization: clinical trials, 
FDA approval, and the like. The problem is that once the compound is 
developed - once the collaborative ffort has been completed - Warner- 
Lambert seems to be in a position to take advantage of the sequential 
structure of the arrangement. After Ligand has performed its portion of 
the effort o identify particular compounds, Warner-Lambert must initi- 
ate the regulatory process and commercialization, which enormously in- 
creases its financial commitment. At that point, the potential for oppor- 
tunistic renegotiation resurfaces. Warner-Lambert might seek to 
119. See supra Part III.C (detailing provisions of Warner-Lambert-Ligand 
agreement) . 
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renegotiate downward the previously contracted royalty terms through 
which Ligand will share in the value created by the collaboration. At this 
stage of the relationship, uncertainty has been resolved and the respec- 
tive decision rights of the parties are therefore contractible - that is, 
there is a discrete decision to go forward with commercializing the prod- 
uct rather than a series of iterations as in the collaborative stage. Hence, 
an explicit contractual device is both necessary and feasible. 
B. Coordination Cascades and the New Governance Mechanisms 
While the contractual mechanisms employed will vary depending on 
the needs of the parties - especially, the length of the collaboration - the 
mechanisms themselves fall into several functional categories. Since the 
collaboration is designed to produce information about the parties' capa- 
bilities and their capacities for cooperation, the collaborative/ learning 
phase initially requires that both parties invest in producing information. 
In turn, mutual investment in information deters opportunism during 
the collaboration by locking in the participants and by screening out nat- 
urally opportunistic counterparties. Finally, allocating decision rights at 
the end stage deters opportunism for those collaborations that are not 
open-ended. In the following discussion, we describe these functional 
categories and the contractual mechanisms that fall within them. 
1. The Function of the Collaborative /Learning Phase. - A key set of con- 
tractual mechanisms regulates the collaborative/ learning process. The 
set comprises two types: those mechanisms designed to facilitate iterative 
investments in information and those designed to improve the quality of 
the information produced. We discuss each in turn. 
a. Iterative Investments in Information. - Our three illustrative con- 
tracts - Deere-Stanadyne, Apple-SCI, and Warner-Lambert-Ligand - 
share a common feature. Each establishes formal governance structures: 
processes of interaction and dispute resolution. One might imagine 
many reasons for writing down adaptation protocols: The process builds 
consensus, enhances learning, minimizes misunderstanding, and the like. 
But none of those reasons explains why the elaborate governance struc- 
tures in these contracts are made part of a formal contract. The first step, 
therefore, is to find a theoretical framework that addresses that question. 
The role of the contract as a nexus for the parties to invest in learn- 
ing about each other's capabilities is seen most starkly in the 
Deere-Stanadyne agreement, where it is the only binding element of the 
contract. From Stanadyne's (or any new supplier's) perspective, the con- 
tract is an invitation to enter the Achieving Excellence program, through 
which the parties will learn about each other, and Deere' s experience will 
move the supplier up the supplier status ladder. The parties' investments 
in the relationship grow as the process continues, providing the supplier 
the assurance that Deere will place orders with it. Recall that neither the 
contract itself, nor the Achieving Excellence program, obligates Deere to 
purchase any product at all. In short, the contract operates entirely as a 
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governance structure that facilitates learning about the parties' 
capabilities. 
From this perspective, the Deere-Stanadyne contract resembles a 
more famous contract hat, over the years, has been the focus of a great 
deal of academic attention: the General Motors-Fisher Body supply con- 
tract for the supply of auto bodies to GM in the 1920s. As Victor 
Goldberg has recently shown, the General Motors-Fisher Body supply 
contract was, in truth, legally unenforceable, a fact that previously had 
been missed in the large literature concerning the contract but that the 
lawyers who wrote the contract would have known.120 Thus, this more 
famous contract operated like the Deere-Stanadyne contract: as a way of 
organizing the parties' learning and continued collaboration, their ex- 
pectations with the investment protected by ever increasing mutual 
dependency. 
A governance arrangement is also at the center of the Apple-SCI 
agreement. The parties commit to prepare a product plan, which will 
contain the specifications, quality requirements, price schedule, and 
other terms. The contract gives the parties joint responsibility for all 
manufacturing design and equipment technology, testing, tooling, and 
the like. SCI controls the test engineering process,121 but Apple 
monitors, requiring progress reports, preproduction review, and progress 
monitoring to achieve preproduction deliverables.122 The formal con- 
tract thus specifies an iterative process in which the parties cooperate in 
designing the product and the manufacturing process. The contract allo- 
cates initial responsibility to SCI for test engineering while Apple 
monitors their performance and receives progress reports leading to an 
agreement on product characteristics and the manufacturing process, the 
substance of which is not specified in the contract. Only after Apple signs 
off on the preproduction deliverables does real production begin. The 
parties agree to co-engineer product cost reductions, to set goals, and to 
meet quarterly while production is underway. At each step in the 
preproduction process, the parties learn about each other's technical ca- 
pacity to accomplish the necessary design tasks and ability to cooperate in 
a productive fashion, to share information readily, and to effectively man- 
age the employees involved despite the nonhierarchical characteristics of
the relationship. This process takes on greater and greater importance 
with time. As the product evolves in response to technology and market 
120. See Victor P. Goldberg, Lawyers Asleep at the Wheel? The GM-Fisher Body 
Contract, 17 Indus. & Corp. Change 1071, 1076-80 (2008). In particular, it seems that GM 
wanted to learn from the Fisher brothers, both of whom were given seats on GM's board, 
how better to organize flexible, co-design relations with its other suppliers - a capacity that 
Fisher Body had demonstrated in its relations with demanding customers like Chrysler. 
See Helper et al., supra note 47, at 452-53. 
121. Apple-SCI Agreement, supra note 90, art. 5.2. 
122. Id. art. 5.3. 
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changes, legacy specifications and processes become less important; the 
collaborative process represents the future. 
Paralleling the iterative co-design process, the Apple-SCI contract 
also specifies a dispute resolution process, which appears to develop in- 
formation about each party's character. The contract provides that each 
party designate one person to be the single operations manager for the 
day-to-day administration of the agreement. When the two individuals 
cannot resolve an issue, the issue moves up (and then back down) the 
hierarchies in a fashion that must be observable to each company's désig- 
née, if the process is to work. And of course, another critical piece of 
information - whether it works - also will be observable. 
The Apple-SCI agreement thus has parallel formal structures that 
function to provide critical information about the characteristics entral 
to the success of a project requiring collaborative innovation: Do the par- 
ties have the technical capabilities? Do the parties have the skills neces- 
sary to manage cooperation? And what are the parties' dispute-resolution 
styles - does each cooperate or fight? The continued interaction over the 
initial three-year period, especially as the results of the collaboration re- 
present a higher percentage of the product being produced, leads to in- 
creasing information on each of these dimensions. 
The Warner-Lambert-Ligand agreement has similar explicit terms 
that dictate a structure for the continued interaction of the parties, which 
in turn results in a learning process similar to that in the 
Deere-Stanadyne and Apple-SCI agreements. During the first stage of 
the contract, Ligand uses its proprietary technology to identify com- 
pounds that hold promise for estrogen therapy. Warner-Lambert then 
has the option, based on Ligand 's performance, of extending the ar- 
rangement into a developmental period, when a "Joint Research 
Committee" composed of three representatives from each firm manages 
further esearch. Decisions must be unanimous; disagreements within 
the committee are resolved in conference between one senior manager 
from each company. Both parties have a large incentive to collaborate in 
the pre-exercise period, and to learn about the other party's capabilities 
and characteristics. Ligand's incentive is to provide enough information 
to cause Warner-Lambert to exercise its option to continue the project. 
Warner-Lambert's incentive is that the value of its option goes up as it 
gains more information and is better able to predict the probability distri- 
bution of the payoffs to further investment in the compounds 
identified.123 
123. The option to extend also operates as a valuable right to abandon the project, 
either because the project is not working or because Warner-Lambert is not satisfied with 
Ligand's performance. See generally supra note 103 (discussing Warner-Lambert 
extension option). In two recent articles, Robinson and Stuart explore the role of 
networks in supporting reputational sanctions in biotech strategic alliances. Robinson & 
Stuart, Financial Contracting, supra note 94; Robinson & Stuart, Network Effects, supra 
note 101. The articles conclude that the centrality of the biotech company in the industry 
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In sum, the three contracts share a common structure: explicit 
mechanisms with respect to collaboration and dispute resolution. Thus, 
during the collaboration period, the production of information about 
the contracting parties is supported by the formally specified collabora- 
tion and dispute resolution processes. 
b. The Role of the Contract Referee Mechanism. - Despite the central 
role of the collaborative/learning phase in providing the parties valuable 
information about each other's character, it cannot guarantee a coopera- 
tive outcome. Common experience teaches that transactions relying on 
informal enforcement can break down because relational enforcement 
requires that each party be able to observe and properly characterize the 
other's behavior. The required transparency dissipates when adaptations 
are complex and the sequence of performances are interrelated, pre- 
cisely the circumstance in contracts for collaborative innovation, where 
debate over the right strategy is to be expected. In such circumstances, 
the parties' signals are noisy: They do not perfectly demonstrate whether 
the disagreement is in good faith, part of the cooperative process, or, 
instead, an indication of opportunism. In complex interactions, disputes 
may or may not reflect a failure to cooperate; what one party intends as a 
cooperative response - "good idea but what about . . ." - may be mistak- 
enly interpreted as a defection.124 Lacking clarity, either party may mis- 
characterize the other's actions. In these circumstances, without he nec- 
essary linkage between action and response, reciprocity will be a less 
effective mechanism for enforcement. 
network of alliances is the key to explaining both the use of nonverifiable contract erms 
like best efforts and the commitment to treat the alliance as seriously as the biotech does 
other alliances in the governing contracts. Centrality is treated as a proxy for reputation; 
the conclusion is that reputation operates as an implicit enforcement mechanism. While 
we recognize the role of reputation as one element of switching costs, we remain skeptical 
about the extent to which reputation can carry the weight Robinson and Stuart assign to it. 
Most important, it is extremely difficult for third parties, however well-connected, to 
observe the conduct of the parties. Suppose a venture fails. Given the very low likelihood 
of finding a successful drug, the most reasonable inference is that the outcome is the result 
of bad luck, not poor skills or bad faith. From this perspective, reputation is hard to gain, 
but it is also hard to lose. Both require repetitive results to separate the signal from the 
noise. From a contracting for innovation perspective, a better explanation for the use of 
terms that are difficult to observe or verify is to help set expectations for the nature of the 
parties' ongoing collaboration. The point is not to impose a standard that will trigger 
sanctions but to identify a goal that will help organize the collaborative ffort. See Oliver 
Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points 1, 4-13 (Nov. 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=944784 (developing contractual model based on view that "a contract provides a 
reference point for the parties' trading relationship"). 
124. If one party mistakenly observes a defection when the other party intended to 
cooperate, a tit-for-tat strategy will collapse into repetitive retaliation. For an accessible 
account of the problem for cooperation created by "noise" impacting parties' perceptions 
of their counterparties' actions, see generally Jonathan Bendor et al., When in Doubt . . . : 
Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner's Dilemma, 35 J. Conflict Res. 691, 712-14 (1991). 
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The risk of misinterpreting the other party's actions is mitigated in 
our exemplar contracts by what we call the "contract referee" mechanism. 
This part of the governance structure typically combines three key ele- 
ments: (a) the commitment o share and exchange information during 
the collaboration,125 (b) the assignment of decision rights to a joint pro- 
ject management team subject to a unanimity rule,126 and (c) the ap- 
pointment of "referees" - representatives from each firm charged with 
resolving disputes.127 
The contract referee mechanism has several effects. First, the refer- 
ees provide information concerning the nature of a complex interaction 
that others cannot obtain directly. A referee can clarify misunderstand- 
ings early, avoiding false negatives - i.e., the interpretation of the other's 
behavior as a defection. When she finds that a defection has indeed oc- 
curred, a referee can, by "blowing the whistle" while providing for a fast 
and low-cost resolution to the dispute, forestall disproportionate re- 
sponses by the aggrieved party. These steps promote the development of 
a cooperative equilibrium and reinforce the "lock-in" effects that have 
been experimentally observed.128 The referee also serves as an informal 
125. See, for example, the Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract, where the parties agree 
to disclose to each other all background technology relevant o the field and helpful to 
performing the work set out in the Research Plan. Both commit to provide resources 
necessary to carry out the Plan. Warner-Lambert-Ligand Agreement, supra note 102, art. 
2.1. Each agrees to allocate a certain number of FTEs to the Plan. Id. art. 2.3. All 
collaboration discoveries and technology are to be "promptly disclosed" to either party, 
and monthly reports are required on all biological structures and compounds. Id. art. 2.7. 
The contract calls for maintenance and inspection of records. Similarly, the Apple-SCI 
contract provides that the parties will co-engineer product cost reductions, setting goals 
and meeting every three months during the term. Apple- SCI Agreement, supra note 90, 
art. 10.6. SCI agrees to share all production-cost information, and Apple agrees to share all 
marketing forecasts. Id. arts. 10.6(b), 11.1. The parties co-design lead-time reductions. 
Id. art. 11.7. 
126. While a unanimity rule is common to many of these contracts, it is not an 
essential feature. Typically, a unanimity rule exacerbates hold-up problems but here 
parties deliberately contract into it. In this context, not exercising the option to behave 
opportunistically by taking advantage of the unanimity rule is a credible signal of 
cooperation. The Warner-Lambert- Ligan d contract is typical in providing for such an 
elaborate management structure. The Joint Research Committee (JRC) consists of three 
representatives from each firm, with one of the Ligand representatives serving as the Chair. 
Warner-Lambert-Ligand Agreement, supra note 102, art. 3.1.1. The JRC has control and 
decision rights over the Research Plan and is responsible for co-design and 
implementation. Id. art. 3.1.2. The JRC holds quarterly meetings, and all decisions are by 
unanimous vote. Id. arts. 3.1. 3-. 1.4. 
127. See, for example, the Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract, which provides that all 
decisions are by unanimous vote, id. art. 3.1.4, and disagreements are resolved by the CEO 
of Ligand and the president of Warner-Lambert's Pharmaceutical division (or their 
désignées). Id. art. 3.2. 
128. See, e.g., John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under 
Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2421, 2422 (2000) (noting how buyer may be 
"locked in with a particular seller, either because the seller is a monopolist or because the 
buyer would face high costs of locating an alternative seller[, and thus] the seller can make 
the contract self-enforcing bycutting off further dealings") . 
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disciplining mechanism. Superiors are unlikely to look with favor on sub- 
ordinates who send problems up the line for resolution. The subordi- 
nates' job is to resolve problems, not escalate them. Second, the use of 
collaborative teams also disciplines hirking, particularly if there is a una- 
nimity requirement and all will be punished for the sins of a few.129 
Third, the collaboration process produces symmetrical information about 
two key variables: the value created by the collaboration and the prefer- 
ences for reciprocal cooperation. So long as both parties are symmetri- 
cally informed and temptations to play chicken are muted, then collabo- 
rative interaction - Coasian bargaining - will lead to efficient decisions. 
Thus, the contract referee mechanism functions both to reduce moral 
hazard and to improve the quality of the information shared by the 
parties. 
Next, we focus on the potential for opportunism resulting from first 
the collaborative and then the pie-splitting phases of the transactions, 
and on the characteristic responses. 
2. Mechanisms for Deterring Ongoing Opportunism. - The risk of op- 
portunistic behavior during the collaboration increases as the parties 
make asymmetric relation-specific investments. However, the informa- 
tion produced by the contractual mechanisms discussed above alleviates 
this problem in two ways. First, it builds switching costs and thus locks the 
parties into the relationship. And second, it screens out naturally oppor- 
tunistic counterparties. We address each feature in turn. 
a. Building Switching Costs During the Collaborative/Learning Phase. - 
Central to our analysis of these new arrangements is the role of switching 
costs - costs that a party must incur to change from one counterparty to 
another.130 The term is connected most directly in the literature with 
inquiry into whether rigorous initial competition adequately compensates 
for the absence of competition after the first purchase;131 but it also ap- 
129. Stewart Macaulay noted this forty ears ago: 
[I] nternal sanctions will induce performance. For example, sales personnel must 
face angry customers when there has been a late or defective performance. The 
salesmen do not enjoy this and will put pressure on the production personnel 
responsible for the default. If the production personnel default too often, they 
will be fired. 
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. 
Soc. Rev. 55, 63 (1963). Macaulay also described feedback mechanisms where buyers issue 
"report cards" to management of sellers, report cards that can then be used to discipline 
personnel. See id. 
130. See generally Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: 
Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 Handbook of Industrial 
Organization 1967, 1972-74 (Mark Armstrong & Ronald H. Porter eds., 2007) (defining 
switching costs). 
131. Paul Klemperer, Switching Costs, in 8 The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics 125, 125 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
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pears in accounts of search costs,132 path dependency,138 first-mover ad- 
vantage,134 and reputation.135 For our purposes, the common core idea 
is that information costs - for example, the cost of learning whether a 
supplier is generally collaborative, and can therefore be counted on to 
act in good faith in hard times - can create barriers to replacing one 
counterparty with another. In a deep spot market, such replacement is 
costless. But in markets where learning about the quality of potential 
substitute suppliers and their products is time consuming and expensive, 
there can be significant barriers - switching costs - to exiting a 
relationship. 
The switching costs of interest to us have two peculiar characteristics. 
First, the raising of barriers to exit is not simply a feature of the context 
or market, as in search costs, nor is it the result of a unilateral effort by 
one side to make it difficult for others to exit, as with first-mover advan- 
tages. These switching costs are produced, rather, by a joint effort of the 
parties - an instrumental effort that is central to the structure of the rela- 
tionship. As the Deere-Stanadyne contract discussed above illustrates, 
the parties make large investments in relation-specific information con- 
cerning each other's capabilities, investments that would be lost if the 
relationship terminated and that would have to be duplicated with any 
new supplier. Second, these investments are made gradually, rather than 
132. Search costs are the costs associated with finding out what other parties offer 
competitive goods and at what price. E.g., Alan Schwartz 8c Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in 
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 630, 635, 641-46 (1979) (defining search costs and describing how switching costs 
interact with search costs to influence consumer behavior in sequential search model). 
133. In a path dependent environment, factors such as increasing returns and 
network externalities result in an equilibrium that may not be the "most" efficient. Initial 
conditions, determined by serendipity or factors traditionally viewed as noneconomic, such 
as culture or politics, can move the system down a particular path. Later on, moving off 
that path - switching - to a better position may be extremely difficult because of large 
transition costs. W. Brian Arthur provides an accessible survey of the concept. See W. 
Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, Sei. Am., Feb. 1990, at 92, 92-99. For 
discussions in an institutional context, see Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, 
and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757, 763-64, 772-825 (1995) (showing path- 
dependence effect of network externalities on corporate contract erms) ; SJ. Leibowitz & 
Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. Econ. 8c Org. 205, 
206-23 (1995) (defining and distinguishing three forms of path dependence, illustrated by 
video-recorder market); Mark J. Roe, Commentary, Chaos and Evolution in Law and 
Economics, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 646-53 (1996) (explaining how "weak-form," "semi- 
strong form," and "strong-form" path dependence differ and how they affect institutional 
form). 
134. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varían, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to 
the Network Economy 168-69 (1999) (explaining how first-mover advantage can be 
exploited to increase customer switching costs, thus "mak[ing] rival entry unattractive"). 
135. In circumstances where third parties cannot perfectly observe the conduct of 
parties to a contract, one party exiting the relationship may raise questions about that 
party's reliability that require investment by potential contracting parties in order to 
answer. Thus, that a party risks reputation costs by exiting is simply a particular 
information cost associated with switching. 
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all at the outset of the relationship. In effect, the switching costs in the 
contracts we analyze here increase in step with the learning generated by 
the project. In this sense they are inherent in the collaborative ffort. 
Precisely how do switching costs constrain opportunism during the 
collaborative/learning phase of the contract? Recall that the parties' ef- 
forts are not contractible because of the need for continuous mutual ad- 
aptation as collaboration resolves uncertainty one step at a time. We have 
seen that the formal mechanisms of our three contracts induced the par- 
ties to develop information about their respective capabilities and to de- 
velop the human capital necessary for successful collaboration. But the 
flip side of this reciprocal earning - and the coordinate development of 
collaborative skills - is that each party successively raises its switching 
costs: The longer the interaction, the more each party knows about the 
other, the higher the switching costs, and the greater the constraint on 
opportunism. Switching costs may also be increased by the industry con- 
text; they rise as the technology race in a given industry intensifies and as 
the delay associated with reproducing the information necessary to work 
effectively with a different supplier or customer becomes more costly. 
Thus, both contract and context make backing out costly for one or both 
of the parties. In many environments, witching costs or barriers to exit 
are understood as unfortunate frictions that undermine access to compet- 
itive alternatives. In the cases we examine, however, switching costs result 
from deliberate contractual choices designed to structure the parties' re- 
lationship efficiently. 
Consider the Deere-Stanadyne agreement. As we have already 
stressed, two elements of the relationship serve to build switching costs as 
the parties invest in information about each other's capabilities for inno- 
vation and cooperation, and about each other's dispute resolution 
style.136 First, with the passage of time, Deere's products and the parts 
being supplied by Stanadyne evolve in response to changes in the market, 
changes in technology, and the parties' joint innovation. The differences 
between the initial product (and the process by which it was produced) 
and the current one is thus a measure of the growing size of the switching 
costs resulting from the parties' investments in learning about each 
other. Second, the structure of the Achieving Excellence program, which 
contemplates the supplier's rise in status with the passage of time and the 
growth of Deere's experience, provides a formal parallel process: rank in 
the hierarchy of supplier classifications increases as switching costs grow. 
The Apple-SCI agreement reflects a similar role for switching costs 
as a constraint on opportunistic claiming of too much of the gain from 
collaborative innovation. To the extent that Apple's other contractual 
suppliers could not immediately expand their production or were less 
effective at collaborative innovation, adding a new supplier to replace SCI 
would be costly for Apple for three reasons: (1) the delay in securing 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 77-83. 
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another supplier given that the specifications and production technology 
had been co-engineered with SCI, and necessarily reflect the idiosyncra- 
sies of SCI's capabilities; (2) Apple's lack of knowledge about the capabil- 
ities of potential new suppliers that it had concerning SCI; and 
(3) Apple's need to learn about the way potential replacements handled 
disputes, where such knowledge can only develop iteratively over time. 
Even expanding the production assigned to an existing supplier is costly 
because, by reducing the number of suppliers, it gives the remaining sup- 
pliers greater leverage and reduces the number of partners in innovation. 
As each party's switching costs rise, the relation between them more 
closely approximates a bilateral monopoly. At the limit, it resembles a 
purely competitive, zero-sum chicken game: Even though both parties 
have high switching costs, there is a temptation to bluff defection so as to 
secure a larger portion of the ex post surplus. This is where the dispute 
resolution process becomes salient. It provides the opportunity for an 
iterative learning process concerning each party's dispute resolution 
style - whether they are cooperative or competitive (as in a chicken 
game). To the extent that styles are not greatly malleable137 - that is, 
people (and institutions) do not easily switch from cooperators to defec- 
tors - then the explicit contract provisions covering dispute resolution 
serve the same learning function along this dimension as the explicit con- 
tract provisions governing the staffing, budget, and interaction of the col- 
laborative innovation effort. 
In sum, our exemplar contracts systematically generate symmetrical 
investments in information through governance mechanisms designed to 
create knowledge both about the product and about each other's capac- 
ity to cooperate in problem-solving and in dispute resolution. A plausible 
hypothesis, therefore, is that these contracts are self-enforcing in the stan- 
dard fashion: either the parties are relying on reputational sanctions 
(also a form of switching costs) or on the overhang of future interactions 
(cheating by a party in one round will be punished by the other in the 
next) to make their promises credible. Indeed, the analogous practice of 
firms issuing legally unenforceable "comfort letters" to prospective lend- 
ers has been explained as a reputational signal that makes the agree- 
ments self-enforcing by establishing the party's obligations even if there is 
no formal enforcement mechanism.138 But the contracts in our group do 
not square easily with this common understanding of the domain of self- 
enforcing agreements. For example, the Deere-Stanadyne and the 
137. The behavioral iterature suggests that these preferences are quite stable. Robert 
E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1641, 
1663-65 (2003) [hereinafter Scott, Indefinite Agreements]. 
138. Rene Sacasas & Don Wiesner, Comfort Letters: The Legal and Business 
Implications, 104 Banking LJ. 313, 329 (1987) ("Legally vague promises and inferences 
from cautious language are not always valueless in business .... Custom shows that 
memorializing even a weak legal commitment carries some moral and business weight. 
The letter can be shown to others, and reputations can be injured by the writer's breach of 
faith."). 
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Apple-SCI agreements are plainly intended to be long-term supply ar- 
rangements, but the source of the constraints on opportunism as the sup- 
ply relationship goes forward is not readily apparent. 
First, reputational sanctions - that is, that potential replacement sup- 
pliers will be more skeptical of doing business with an opportunistic 
buyer - depend on assumptions concerning the observability of the 
buyer's conduct to potential suppliers which rest, in turn, on conditions 
that are difficult to sustain.139 These conditions may not always be met or 
may sometimes be only partially met. Indeed, reputational sanctions are 
best seen as a special, and especially context sensitive, case of switching 
costs. In fact, the transactions represented by our group of co-design con- 
tracts are, for the most part, transactions in heterogeneous markets where 
reputational constraints are thought to be quite weak.140 In such an envi- 
ronment, reputation alone is an inadequate means of credibly enforcing 
promises. Even if others can observe the contractual failure, it would be 
difficult to learn the true reasons for the transactional breakdown. Ab- 
sent much of the information the parties can learn from iterative cooper- 
ation, the mere fact of breakdown is not sufficient to impose a reputa- 
tional cost on either party. If informal (or relational) enforcement is to 
be a satisfactory explanation for this innovative collaboration, its domain 
therefore must be extended to encompass switching costs. 
Second, the contracts do not themselves try to detail the future rela- 
tionship between the parties beyond the initial arrangement. Thus, the 
expectation of a long-term relationship does not appear to rest on the 
discipline of repeated dealings, the standard foundation for relational 
contracts that do not depend on reputational sanctions.141 More pre- 
cisely, the contracts do not seem to be a tit-for-tat solution to a multi- 
139. Gilson, Venture Capital, supra note 69, at 1086. 
140. Reputations are most effective in small homogeneous communities, where 
noncooperative behavior quickly becomes common knowledge and sanctions against such 
behavior can be effectively imposed. See, e.g., Avner Greif, Informal Contract 
Enforcement: Lessons from Medieval Trade, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law 287, 288 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of 
the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract 
Law, 10 J. Legal Stud. 349, 359 (1981) (discussing ethnic community ties). Reputational 
sanctions can also be effective in industries with established trade associations that can 
both identify the bad behavior and coordinate sanctions. See Lisa Bernstein, Private 
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, 
and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724, 1745-54, 1762-87 (2001) (discussing existence, 
importance, and supporting institutional conditions of reputation-based nonlegal 
sanctions in cotton industry); cf. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: 
Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 
1771-77, 1787-95, 1815-20 (1996) (concluding that formalist contract enforcement by 
private system of merchant courts established by National Grain and Feed Association 
results from recognition of, and to support, role of extralegal, reputational sanctions) . 
141. Neither contract contains the sort of explicit price and quantity adjustment 
provisions, common to long-term contracts, which are designed to deal with ex post 
opportunism in the face of either exogenous events or attempts to take advantage of the 
other party's high cost of changing to another supplier/ customer. In the absence of these 
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round prisoners' dilemma in the form of a supply contract.142 Rather, 
the contract structure is designed to support collaboration and co-design, 
not cooperation and retaliation. The prisoner's dilemma game would be 
quite noisy: Cheating would be hard to detect because of the continual 
uncertainty arising from the parties' ongoing innovation. Thus, neither 
of the standard self-enforcement mechanisms fits our contract exemplars. 
b. Switching Costs as Screens for Reciprocity. - A question we have 
posed earlier recurs: Why do these contracts contain elaborate procedu- 
ral mechanisms to govern environments where the speed of adaptation 
renders largely ineffective any recourse to standard legal enforcement? 
One hypothesis is that these agreements, in addition to being designed 
for parties to learn about each other's competence and about market 
conditions, are designed to allow parties to learn about each other's pref- 
erences to behave reciprocally and to cooperate in resolving disputes. 
The experimental behavioral literature shows that contracting par- 
ties are heterogeneous regarding their preferences for cooperation. A 
significant percentage of transactors generally reward cooperation and 
punish defection, but an equally large percentage generally act in pure 
self-interest and behave opportunistically.143 Thus, the challenge is to 
terms, instances of iterated cooperative adjustment would be unlikely to emerge 
spontaneously. 
142. See generally Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 27-54 (1984) 
(explaining success of "tit-for-tat" strategy - e.g., matching the cooperate/ defect decision 
made by one's opponent in the previous round - in multi-round prisoner dilemma 
"tournaments"). 
143. The substantial body of experimental evidence on people's propensity to 
reciprocate yields two key findings. First, many people respond cooperatively to generous 
acts and, conversely, punish noncooperative behavior. Such people exhibit reciprocal 
behavior that varies from that which a purely self-interested person would exhibit. Second, 
reciprocal propensity differs in degree from person to person: Some people exhibit 
reciprocal behavior, and others exhibit self-interested behavior. Taking all the 
experiments together - gathered from diverse countries and cultures - the fraction of 
reciprocating subjects ranges from forty to sixty percent, as does the fraction of self- 
interested subjects. For discussion, see Ernst Fehr 8c Simon Gätcher, Fairness and 
Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, J.Econ. Persp., Summer 2000, at 159, 162 
[hereinafter Fehr 8c Gätcher, Fairness and Retaliation] ("Many studies have carried out 
detailed analyses of individual decisions and found that the fraction of subjects exhibiting 
reciprocal choices is between forty and sixty-six percent."); Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as 
a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence, 65 Econometrica 833, 850 
(1997) (finding roughly half of subjects punishing shirkers, and roughly half rewarding 
non-shirkers); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and 
Cooperation, 114 QJ. Econ. 817, 818 (1999) (suggesting that observed behaviors can be 
explained by assuming that some actors are self-interested, while some are motivated by 
fairness); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 
Am. Econ. Rev. 1281, 1283 (1993) (describing experiment showing contribution rate at 
forty to sixty percent of socially optimal level in one-shot public-goods-decision games). 
For applications of this experimental evidence to contract and international law, see 
Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the 
Enforcement of International Law 88-94, 122-27 (Cambridge 2006) [hereinafter Scott & 
Stephan, Leviathan]; Robert E. Scott 8c Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International 
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identify who are the cooperators and who are likely to behave 
opportunistically. ] 44 
The willingness to write a contract hat conditions on nonverifìable 
procedural factors is not, by itself, a reliable signal that either party is a 
cooperator. But the contracts in our group have an additional feature: 
The procedural mechanism that generates information about the feasibil- 
ity of the project itself also creates opportunities to cooperate at early 
stages of the relationship. The mechanism therefore also renders observ- 
able the parties' characters with respect to dispute resolution, at a time 
when specific investments are modest and switching costs are low.145 
Early reciprocation, which serves to gradually lock the parties into a rela- 
tionship, signals that the parties intend to cooperate and provides infor- 
mation about their types. 
The formal governance structure established in these contracts func- 
tions in two ways to identify a party's type. First, the obligation to share 
information in the collaborative/learning phase of the contract provides 
opportunities to observe the behavior of the other in response to oppor- 
tunities to reciprocate. This gives each party the opportunity to acquire 
knowledge of the other's propensities.146 To be sure, some parties may 
attempt to "act reciprocally" during the initial collaborative process only 
to turn to opportunistic behavior when the investments are much greater. 
But that problem is mitigated by the second way in which the formal gov- 
ernance structure signals a party's type. In addition to observation, the 
collaborative learning process serves to separate in time the opportunity 
to reciprocate from the end-stage transaction that is contemplated. It 
thus forces the expenditure of time for the purposes of communication, 
thereby increasing the cost of switching. ] 47 In this case, the transactors 
are not only subject to observation, but the parties must spend considera- 
Agreements and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 551, 564-68, 582-96; Scott, 
Indefinite Agreements, upra note 137, at 1661-75. 
144. To be sure, the experimental evidence relates to the behavior ot individuals and 
not to the behavior of firms. Nevertheless, the collaborative process that these contracts 
stimulate is undertaken by dedicated teams of individuals who are personally invested in 
the success of the co-design initiative. Thus, if the behavioral iterature on reciprocity is at 
all relevant o institutions, it would be in the contracting environments we are describing. 
145. There is anecdotal evidence that managers believe that preferences for 
reciprocity are stable and can be observed even in institutional settings. John McMillan 
and Christopher Woodruff report for example that one manager believed that "'[p]eople 
show their personality through their actions in difficult times,' so after a few transactions 
this manager selected a few customers to concentrate on." McMillan & Woodruff, supra 
note 128, at 2432. 
146. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. Econ. 488, 497-99 (1970) (discussing how creditors in 
India use knowledge of debtors' propensities gained from repeated dealings to reduce 
credit risk). 
147. See generally A. Michael Spence, Time and Communication in Economic and 
Social Interaction, 87 QJ. Econ. 651, 651 (1973) ("[T]he fact that [communication] takes 
time . . . imparts ignaling power to it."). 
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ble time and effort in executing portions of an agreement, time and ef- 
fort that is effectively nonverifiable and thus can only be self-enforcing. 
Because cooperative parties can internalize the returns to general infor- 
mation about their type through an enhanced reputation for coopera- 
tion, they are more willing to spend resources, like time and effort, to 
provide that information.148 The expenditure of time performing a 
nonverifiable promise is itself a signal: Because these costs make it diffi- 
cult for a competitor who lacks the characteristic nonetheless to imitate 
the behavior, it may signal a preference for reciprocity. 
In sum, our examples of co-design contracts suggest that the wide- 
spread use of elaborate, nonverifiable (and therefore unenforceable) 
governance obligations may be in part a function of their properties as 
screens for the parties' willingness to engage in cooperative behavior. 
Knowledge of the other parties' propensities, and therefore the cost of 
acquiring equivalent information about any replacement, increases in 
parallel with iterative performance. This period of building up switching 
costs ranges in our exemplar contracts from fifteen months in the 
Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract to three years in the Apple-SCI con- 
tract and potentially much longer in the Deere-Stanadyne contract. It is 
the unique and innovative feature of these contracts: They use the pro- 
cess of collaboration to generate new information in two ways - to create 
the innovative product and to bind each party to the other in a process of 
symmetrical investments so that neither one has a hold-up advantage over 
the other at any point in time. To be sure, the parties are then in a 
bilateral monopoly and run the risk of playing chicken games in the pre- 
dictable event of disagreement. But this risk is reduced by the fact that 
the iterated co-design process also contains a mechanism that allows early 
exit, for example, Deere's right not to purchase any product at all from a 
particular supplier and Warner-Lambert's right to elect early termination 
of the project. 
To summarize the argument to this point: A contract hat requires 
relation-specific investments ex ante but where the resolution of uncer- 
tainty will require ex post renegotiation will not work unless opportunism 
is effectively constrained. Assigning ex post decision rights ex ante will 
not work in the face of ongoing collaboration and uncertainty - one can- 
not tell ahead of time to whom decision rights should be given. The mu- 
tual raising of switching costs will constrain opportunism even in the face 
of uncertainty. One function of the elaborate governance and dispute 
148. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of 
Income, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 283, 287 (1975). Another way of expressing this point is that 
an opportunist can perhaps dupe a single contracting partner and capture a larger surplus, 
but, once his type is revealed, he is less able to replicate the transaction at low cost. It must 
be stressed, however, that establishing or eroding a reputation requires that the relevant 
behavior (or a credible signal of it) be observable not only to one's existing trading 
partners, but also to potential trading partners, a more complicated issue. Ronald J. 
Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational 
Exchange, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 633, 638 (2007). 
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resolution mechanisms in contracting for innovation is precisely to facili- 
tate this mutual raising of switching costs: The contracts provide a 
screening and learning process about the parties' propensities to behave 
opportunistically that would be costly to duplicate with a new partner.149 
Thus, we see a braiding of explicit and implicit contracting that supports 
a co-design contract: explicit provisions that create knowledge and rou- 
tines that raise switching costs and a dispute resolution mechanism that 
builds mutual knowledge of the propensity to reciprocate and deters be- 
havior that could undermine the cooperative equilibrium. In this way, 
the collaborative mechanism that produces the information necessary to 
the project's success also provides the constraint on opportunism that 
allows collaboration - and innovation - to continue. 
3. Deterring Opportunism at the End Stage: Dividing the Pie with Options. - Thus far, we have focused on situations where the relationship oten- 
tially is long term, uncertainty continues, and there is no final period in 
which collaboration has ended. However, in some contracts that contem- 
plate collaborative innovation, the period for collaboration has a predict- 
able end, at which time the potential for opportunism reappears because 
the parties face a division of the surplus created by the collaboration. 
Here, the contractual response that supports collaborative innovation by 
constraining opportunism takes a different form. 
If the parties' relationship moves from a collaboration stage to an 
end stage, the governance arrangements that operated to support collab- 
oration no longer function. Recall that the relational governance struc- 
ture worked because information about the collaborative process was 
symmetric and the parties could collectively discipline opportunism. But 
once the period of collaboration ends, the potential for opportunism 
reemerges. At this point, however, uncertainty is resolved and decision 
and control rights are contractible x post - they can be assigned by ex- 
plicit contract. The exemplar contracts suggest, therefore, that parties 
may have learned to guard against the risk of opportunism by writing 
contracts with two sets of terms: an implicit (and flexible) set of terms 
that support self-enforcement where rights and obligations are not rea- 
sonably contractible, and an explicit and precise set of terms for legal 
enforcement where decision rights are contractible. 
149. McMillan and Woodruff make a similar argument in discussing relational 
contracting in underdeveloped markets with poor legal systems: 
Bilateral cooperation may evolve in relationships via a process in which the 
potential loss from having a trading partner defect is kept small in initial 
transactions and allowed to increase as the relationship rogresses. . . . Early in 
the relationship, the two sides of the trading relationship test each other. As 
trading continues, experience with the trading partner provides information. . . 
The data show that longer-lasting relationships involve significantly more trust. 
After two years of dealings, the amount of trade credit offered is on average 
fourteen percentage points higher than at the start of the relationship. 
McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 128, at 2432. 
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The Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract provides an illustration of the 
problem and a response. As we have seen, Warner-Lambert has an incen- 
tive to insist ex post on lowering the royalty payments to Ligand once it 
learns that the drug developed is promising.150 (In contrast, in the 
Apple-SCI contract, the pricing terms are subject to review after the pro- 
duction plan is executed, but it is expected that cooperative innovation 
will continue so that high switching costs continue to constrain opportu- 
nism. The Deere-Stanadyne contract operates in a fashion similar to the 
Apple-SCI contract.) But once the Warner-Lambert-Ligand collabora- 
tion process ends and Ligand delivers a compound, Warner-Lambert no 
longer requires Ligand's cooperation, so switching costs are no longer 
relevant; a different mechanism for constraining opportunism is neces- 
sary to support the overall collaborative innovation. In this situation, the 
ex ante contract can supplement the high switching costs (including rep- 
utation effects) operative during the cooperative phase with complemen- 
tary explicit provisions that assign designated decision rights to a specific 
party during the noncooperative phase. 
The Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract supplements switching costs 
by using nested explicit options - the allocation of sequential ex post de- 
cision rights among the parties to deal with opportunism in the 
postcooperative phase. The structure of the contract gives Warner- 
Lambert an initial option, exercisable after the development period ends, 
to extend the contract for another three years to develop the "lead collab- 
oration compounds" identified by Ligand during the prior fifteen 
months. If Warner-Lambert exercises its option, it effectively owns the 
rights to the lead collaboration compounds, subject to a hierarchy of li- 
cense and royalty payments set out in the original agreement. This is a 
point at which Warner-Lambert can act opportunistically ex post. Since 
Ligand cannot further develop a lead collaboration compound itself, 
Warner-Lambert can threaten to exercise the option to extend, but only 
at a lower royalty rate. To be sure, the ex ante royalty arrangement gives 
Warner-Lambert a substantial economic incentive to exercise its option to 
develop a promising project. But the typical "big pharma" has a much 
better capacity to sustain a delay in developing a promising project than 
does an undercapitalized biotech.151 Warner-Lambert's reputation with 
other potential partners might be impaired, as we argued above, a form 
150. See supra text accompanying notes 106-109. 
151. Because Warner-Lambert will receive the great majority of the proceeds from the 
commercialization of a compound, one can argue that Ligand will not need to fear 
opportunistic renegotiation of the royalty rate. The problem, however, is that the 
proceeds from the compound are likely a small part of Warner-Lambert's revenues, but a 
large part of Ligand's revenues, which affects the parties' bargaining power. Additionally, 
a reduction in the royalty rate is attractive to Warner-Lambert because it will be pure profit. 
Finally, the cost of delay may be of less significance to Warner-Lambert. First, so long as 
the delay does not reduce the length of patent protection, the cost is only a present value 
issue. Second, so long as Warner-Lambert's commercialization pipeline does not have an 
infinite capacity - that is, that other projects compete for space in it - the cost of delay is 
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of switching cost that may continue into the end stage, but this depends 
on the motivation for Warner-Lambert's renegotiation being observable 
to other firms with whom Warner-Lambert might work in the future.152 
Given the asymmetry in outside options, the parties have differing threat 
points, and the resulting chicken game would appear to favor Warner- 
Lambert over Ligand. What explicit contract erms guard against this op- 
portunistic threat to renegotiate? 
This problem cannot be addressed simply by linking the royalty to 
the particular results of the co-design collaborative process. The very 
point of the process is that the parties cannot detail ex ante the different 
states of the world that the collaborative innovation may reveal, so that 
one cannot write even a rough state-contingent contract linking royalties 
to outcomes (other than that the rates are, in the end, applied to sales). 
A different explicit technique is necessary. In somewhat analogous situa- 
tions like venture capital contracting and movie development - which 
also involve innovation without he ability ex ante to condition shifting 
payouts on outcomes - the problem is addressed through nested op- 
tions.153 This appears to be the technique used in the exemplar con- 
tracts we observe. 
The Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract creates an explicit nested op- 
tions mechanism that prevents opportunistic renegotiation at the end 
stage. If Warner-Lambert does not extend, then the rights to compounds 
developed by Ligand employees remain with Ligand. Of course, other 
large pharmaceutical companies to whom Ligand then might market he 
compound would be concerned over the signal given by Warner- 
Lambert's decision not to exercise its option to extend. However, by this 
point in the project, the commercial promise of the compounds identi- 
fied by Ligand likely is observable to other pharmaceutical companies. 
Thus, if the observability assumption is correct, and if Warner-Lambert 
seeks to renegotiate the license and royalty fees opportunistically, then 
Ligand can market he compound to other pharmaceutical companies if 
Warner-Lambert declines to extend. 
Of course, the potential for opportunistic renegotiation by Warner- 
Lambert does not disappear when it exercises its option to extend. It can 
renegotiate at any point until the compound clears the FDA - Warner- 
Lambert can threaten not to take the compound through animal trials, 
clinical trials, etc., unless Ligand agrees to lower the licensing and royalty 
only the difference, if any, between the value of the Ligand developed project and the 
value of the project that replaces the Ligand project in the queue. 
152. See supra note 135 (discussing reputation cost as switching cost); supra note 139 
and accompanying text (discussing importance of observability to effectiveness of 
reputation cost as switching cost). 
153. See Gilson, Venture Capital, supra note 69, at 1073-74, 1078-81 (describing use 
of nested options in venture capital contracting); Victor P. Goldberg, The Net Profits 
Puzzle, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 524, 538-42 (1997) (describing use of nested options in movie 
development). 
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rates. Nevertheless, at this stage as well, the explicit contract structure 
addresses the problem. Warner-Lambert has an option to abandon devel- 
opment of a compound during the extension period, but the rights to 
that compound then revert to Ligand. Since the commercial promise of 
the compound will be more transparent with every post-extension stage, 
Ligand' s ability to market the compound to Warner-Lambert's competi- 
tors will increase accordingly, serving as a growing check on opportunistic 
renegotiations. 
C. Risks and Rewards of Braiding Explicit and Implicit Contracts 
What are the consequences of a contractual innovation where parties 
write contracts that contain some terms that are self-enforcing and others 
designed for legal enforcement? The answer to this question depends on 
the possible effects of the alternative means of enforcement on each 
other, and a growing experimental literature is suggestive of the charac- 
ter of the interaction. First, the experimental evidence suggests that the 
various means of self-enforcement - retaliatory threats, reputational sanc- 
tions, and reciprocity - complement each other. For example, experi- 
ments have compared the effort levels of subjects given a single, anony- 
mous opportunity to respond to a generous offer with the effort levels in 
a similar game in which repeated interactions created an additional op- 
portunity to retaliate against selfish behavior.154 The results show that 
repeated interactions cause a significant increase in the effort levels of 
the subjects.155 
154. See Martin Brown et al., Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market 
Interactions 2 (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 
38, 2002), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwpO38.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (comparing effort levels of agents in one-shot gift exchange game 
with effort levels in similar game in which repeated interaction was an additional material 
outcome). 
155. Id. at 27-31. For other experimental evidence bearing on the character of 
repeated interactions, see, e.g., Gary Charness, Responsibility and Effort in an 
Experimental Labor Market, 42 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 375, 380-81 (2000) (finding third- 
party, rather than random, determination of wages in employment relationship diminishes 
effort level of employee by permitting employee to share some amount of responsibility, 
for final outcome, with human, third party rather than having only himself to bear full 
responsibility); Ernst Fehr et al., Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive 
Experimental Markets, 42 Eur. Econ. Rev. 1, 11-22 (1998) (finding that "opportunities for 
reciprocation may significantly alter market outcomes"); Ernst Fehr 8c Armin Falk, Wage 
Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market, 107 J. Pol. Econ. 106, 117-31 
(1999) (finding that, in labor markets characterized by incomplete mployment contracts, 
employers behave reciprocally, when unemployment is high, by refusing to cut wages); 
Simon Gächter 8c Armin Falk, Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour 
Relation, 104 Scandinavian J. Econ. 1, 3, 7-17 (2002) (finding that, while reciprocity 
significantly affects outcomes of both one-shot and repeated games, effect in repeated 
games is stronger because relational settings constrain behavior of otherwise selfish actors, 
causing them to imitate reciprocal behavior) ; Ernst Fehr 8c Klaus M. Schmidt, Theories of 
Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications 4-9 (Ctr. Econ. Stud. & 
Ifo Inst. Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 403, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
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This result makes sense. Informal sanctions are imposed implicitly 
and ex post. Thus, for example, a cooperator can punish a shirker's de- 
fection after the fact without risking offense by announcing in advance 
that there will be a sanction for defection. Reciprocation also may lead to 
a virtuous cycle, in which engaging in cooperative behavior increases 
one's preference for more cooperative behavior.156 Successful coopera- 
tion that generates a reputation for trustworthiness or produces returns 
in ongoing transactions furthers self-interest and this feedback effect may 
strengthen the willingness to reciprocate.157 
How, then, do explicit contractual obligations interact with a govern- 
ance structure designed to screen for and motivate reciprocity? Here, the 
data indicate that absent a legally enforceable obligation, reciprocity - 
operating alone - generates high levels of cooperative behavior.158 But 
the data also indicate that, once the entire relationship, including its im- 
plicit aspects, is subject to formal enforcement, voluntary reciprocity de- 
clines along with the overall evel of cooperation.159 These experimental 
results suggest that formal legal sanctions and informal sanctions based 
on reciprocity may well conflict with each other. In other words, formal 
contracting may "crowd out" behavior based on relational contracting.160 
A careful examination of the experimental evidence shows, however, 
that the crowding-out phenomenon is complex. A number of studies 
have confirmed the crowding-out hypothesis in interactions between indi- 
viduals, where the parties must choose either informal or formal enforce- 
ment: The choice of formal enforcement uniformly suppresses reciproc- 
ity.161 But recent experiments show that, where there is some probability 
that the same buyers and sellers will continue transacting in the next pe- 
riod, formal enforcement that is limited only to the verifiable dimensions 
abstract=255223 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reviewing experimental evidence 
on fairness and reciprocity). 
156. Scott & Stephan, Leviathan, supra note 143, at 102. 
157. Id. 
158. Fehr 8c Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 143, at lbO-70. 
159. Ernst Fehr 8c Simon Gächter, Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary 
Cooperation? 1 (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 
34, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=313028 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) [hereinafter Fehr 8c Gächter, Incentive Contracts] . 
160. For discussion, see Scott, Indefinite Agreements, upra note 137, at 1688-92. 
161. See, e.g., Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract 
Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 131, 132 (2001) (finding that 
"intermediate l vels of contract enforcement lead to crowding out, but low levels induce 
crowding in"); Bruno Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. Econ. Survs. 
589, 596-606 (2001) (surveying empirical literature in support of motivation crowding 
theory); Fehr 8c Gächter, Incentive Contracts, supra note 159, at 15-30 (reporting results 
of study showing that "voluntary cooperation may ... be undermined by incentive 
contracts"); Bruno S. Frey 8c Matthias Benz, Motivation Transfer Effect 1, 9-13 (June 12, 
2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http:// 
www.iew.uzh.ch/home/benz/downloads/MTE.pdf (finding "experimental evidence . . . 
[that] incentives can reduce intrinsic motivation even in areas not subject to the incentive 
mechanism"). 
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of the agreement actually enhances cooperation in those dimensions of 
the agreement that are nonverifiable.162 
Assuming, as before, that these experimental results regarding indi- 
vidual behavior also hold for behavior in the small teams at the core of 
the institutional designs we are examining, the data point consistently in 
the same direction. Explicit contracting can complement and support 
relational governance structures when the contracting parties deploy it to 
supplement the implicit enforcement mechanisms. Thus, where, as in 
the Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract, the explicit mechanisms are de- 
signed to legally enforce only the verifiable terms of a contract, and 
where the parties believe in the prospect of an ongoing relationship, the 
evidence suggests that explicit mechanisms designed to deter opportu- 
nism at the end stage of collaborative contracts may reinforce the pat- 
terns of trust and reciprocity, thereby enabling the parties better to en- 
force themselves the nonverifiable portions of the relationship. 
V. Coming Full Circle: Contracting for Innovation and the 
Theory of the Firm 
Contracts for innovation create interfirm governance structures, 
which in turn can produce changes in the organization of the individual 
firms. The innovations these contracts produce can substantially redirect 
the parties' investment strategies, or lead to the creation of new firms. It 
is thus in the nature of these agreements to blur the distinction between 
contract and organization, or market and firm, that has been at the core 
of efforts to construct a theory of the firm since Ronald Coase's pioneer- 
ing work in the 1930s.163 This brings us back to the second gap between 
theory and current practice that our contracting for innovation analysis 
identifies. In this Part, we suggest how analysis of contracting for innova- 
tion may focus efforts to resolve key controversies regarding the organiza- 
tion of economic activity, controversies that the diffusion of new forms of 
cooperation in recent decades has made central. 
A. From One-to-One to Many-to-Many: Current Understandings of the 
Boundaries of the Firm 
Coase's original insight was to apply marginalist thinking to the or- 
ganization of transactions, and especially to the selection of the instru- 
ments governing them. In determining whether and how to undertake 
the incremental or marginal transaction, Coase reasoned, economic 
agents face a fundamental choice. They could turn to the market for the 
required good or service. In that case, the costs of the transaction are the 
costs of contracting - finding partners, agreeing on prices, addressing the 
162. See Sergio G. Lazzarini et al., Order with Some Law: Complementarity Versus 
Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements, 20J.L. Econ. & Org. 261, 261 (2004). 
163. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937) [hereinafter 
Coase, Nature of the Firm]. 
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need to assure both ex ante and ex post efficiency, and so on. Alterna- 
tively, agents could produce the good or service internally by establishing 
a corresponding hierarchy within the firm. Then the costs of transacting 
are the costs of establishing and operating a bureaucracy.164 The relative 
transaction costs would vary with the nature of the transaction; all else 
being equal, agents prefer in each case the lower cost transaction form. 
The nature of the firm, now understood as the kinds of transactions for 
which it is the lowest cost provider, would thus be revealed by the agents' 
calculations of the costs and benefits of substituting a property rights- 
based hierarchy for contract, or vice versa, in organizing the relevant 
transactions. 
An intuitively appealing way to operationalize this general idea is to 
distinguish various types of transaction costs and identify patterns in their 
incidence that explain salient features of industrial organization. This is 
precisely what Williamson did.165 He argued that the asset specificity of 
complementary investments created the risk of costly hold-ups, and that it 
was infeasible to mitigate that risk by drafting a complete contract cover- 
ing all the contingencies that might affect he division of returns from the 
joint project. Hence, the costs of coordinating such investments through 
the market were prohibitively high and the transactions were instead or- 
ganized within the firm. The result was the vertical integration widely 
observed up through the 1980s and that Chandler famously 
chronicled.166 
But, it turns out, Coase had anticipated and rejected on empirical 
grounds precisely this analysis and the generalization to which it led. As 
he later explained, managers were much less concerned by the prospect 
of hold-ups than he had speculated they might be.167 If they worried 
about the problem at all, he reports, they thought it largely susceptible to 
contractual remedies. He was particularly impressed by the experience of 
A.O. Smith, a leader in industrial automation, based in Milwaukee, which 
supplied a large share of General Motors' auto frames for decades while 
continuing to operate as an independent company.168 Most recently, 
Coase has gone on to argue that the canonical story connecting hold-ups 
and vertical integration - the final takeover of the Fisher Body Company 
in 1926 by General Motors - misconstrues the motives of the transaction: 
On the new account, General Motors' aim was to collaborate more closely 
with the Fisher brothers in managing innovative relations with suppli- 
164. In fact, the costs of hierarchy have remained underilluminated in this strand oí 
the literature, but the thrust of the argument is in the direction suggested here. See, e.g., 
Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, 
Strategy, and Organization, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 511, 526-27 (1990). 
165. See sources cited supra note 1. 
166. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
167. R.H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L. & Econ. 
15, 16 (2000) (finding no hold-up in Fisher Body-General Motors relationship, previously 
thought to be standard example of vertical integration in response to hold-up problem). 
168. Id. at 18. 
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ers - an early variant of the relations described here - rather than to pro- 
tect itself against the (arguably nonexistent) threat of a hold-up.169 This 
assessment, in turn, is consistent with Goldberg's conclusion that the 
GM-Fisher Body contract, like the Deere-Stanadyne contract examined 
earlier, was legally unenforceable and that the parties knew it.170 
Although we are sympathetic to Coase's rejection of the Fisher Body 
story, and of the generalization it is supposed to illustrate, his criticism is 
incomplete. Is the problem, as he sometimes suggests, the insufficient 
attention to empirical detail in transaction cost analysis?171 If so, what 
account of the pattern of transaction costs, and their connection to gov- 
ernance instruments, fits the facts better than the hold-up story? Or is 
the problem deeper, in the very effort o establish a parsimonious list of 
transactions inherently "suited" either to markets or to firms? And if 
there is no such list, how, if at all, should we think of the "nature" of the 
firm? 
In a provocative review of the transaction cost and property rights 
literature on the nature of the firm, Bengt Holmström and John Roberts 
broached this more thoroughgoing critique a decade ago.172 Their argu- 
ments can be seen as a generalization of Coase's objections (albeit a gen- 
eralization that raises questions about the original dichotomy of market 
and firm). Their conclusions invite further development in light of our 
findings here. 
Holmström and Roberts advance two claims. First, they argue that 
the coordination of investments, as exemplified in the threat of hold-ups, 
is but one of the types of governance concerns that managers must en- 
gage. Another pervasive concern regards agency problems: ensuring 
that agents use the discretion they are accorded to pursue the goals set by 
their principals, rather than pursuing their private interests. A vast and 
venerable literature in economics, organizational sociology, and law at- 
tests to the centrality of this concern both within the firm and between 
the firm and its suppliers. Yet another problem regards diffusion of 
knowledge relevant to improvement and innovation. Here too, a large 
literature in both economics and sociology documents management's 
ongoing efforts to create stable, rule-based structures to ensure the circu- 
lation of knowledge which is itself too fluid and imperfectly understood - 
too tacit, as it is often said - to be reducible to rules.173 Indeed, much of 
that literature argues that the chief function of the firm is not to solve 
169. Coase, Conduct of Economics, supra note 17, at 274. 
170. See supra text accompanying note 120. Note that this makes the GM-Fisher 
Body contract analogous to the Deere-Stanadyne contract. 
171. Lafontaine & Slade, supra note 3, surveys the empirical transaction cost 
literature. 
172. See Holmström & Roberts, supra note 9. 
173. See, e.g., Margherita Balconi et al., The "Codification Debate" Revisited: A 
Conceptual Framework to Analyze the Role of Tacit Knowledge in Economics, 16 Indus. & 
Corp. Change 823, 825-45 (2007) (reviewing, clarifying, and reconceptualizing ideas and 
economic roles of tacit knowledge and codification efforts); Managing Industrial 
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hold-up problems but instead to facilitate the flow of the uncodiflable, 
living knowledge that animates innovation.174 
Holmström and Roberts's econd claim goes to the relation between 
the kinds of governance problems and the instruments available to ad- 
dress them. In transaction-cost economics, at its most reductive, this rela- 
tion was one-to-one: Hold-up problems can only be solved by vertical in- 
tegration in the firm and the firm's boundary therefore is dictated by the 
breadth of hold-up problems.175 The core of Coase's criticism of transac- 
tion-cost economics is that the link between the character of transactions 
costs and organizational form is less precise; there is more than one orga- 
nizational response to particular transactions costs. The relation is, at 
least, one to many: Hold-up problems can be solved by contract (as in 
the case of A.O. Smith) as well as by vertical integration. Holmström and 
Roberts suggest that the relation is many-to-many: There are various gov- 
ernance tasks and various instruments for managing them. Each task can 
be addressed by more than one instrument, and each instrument can, 
alone or in combination with others, be used to address more than one 
task. 
The core illustration of this many-to-many relation is Japanese-style 
subcontracting in the automobile industry in the mid-1990s. Holmström 
and Roberts note that, contrary to the predictions of transaction-cost eco- 
nomics,176 the Japanese subcontractors (and their emulators in other 
countries) invest in the co-design of specialized parts and components, 
and in relation-specific equipment (such as expensive, metal-forming 
dies) despite the hold-up and other risks such investments entail. But if 
the organization of Japanese supply chains does not reflect recourse to 
vertical integration to solve the hold-up problem, neither does it reflect 
contract, at least as conventionally understood. The contracts between 
Knowledge: Creation, Transfer and Utilization (Ikujiro Nonaka & David Teece eds., 2001) 
(collecting articles). 
174. See, e.g., Bruce Kogut, Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, 9 
Strategic Mgmt. J. 319, 322-24 (1988) (citing transfer of organizational knowledge as 
motivation for joint ventures); Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, Knowledge of the Firm, 
Combinative Capabilities, and the Replication of Technology, 3 Org. Sci. 383, 383-96 
(1992) ("[W]hat firms do better than markets is the sharing and transfer of the knowledge 
of individuals and groups within an organization."). 
175. As an example, Williamson sets out a stylized mapping of transaction form based 
on the presence of three forms of transaction costs: bounded rationality, opportunism, 
and costly information. If bounded rationality and opportunism were present, but 
information were not costly, then a state-contingent contract was the appropriate 
transaction form. If, instead, bounded rationality were still present, information were 
costly, but opportunism were not present, then a relational contract was the form that 
resulted. Finally, if all three forms of transaction costs were present, the transaction would 
be integrated within a firm. Williamson, Economic Institutions, upra note 1, at 18-35. 
176. See generally An Interview ith Oliver Williamson, 3J. Institutional Econ. 373, 
384 (2007) (acknowledging that transaction-cost economics requires some adjustment to 
explain Japanese supplier relations and declining to "hold that transaction cost economics 
is the only interpretation"). 
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the suppliers and their customers, Holmström and Roberts write, "are 
short and remarkably imprecise, essentially committing the parties only 
to work together to resolve difficulties as they emerge," and to renegoti- 
ate prices regularly.177 Rather, the governing mechanism is the "long- 
term, repeated nature of the interaction,"178 based on shared under- 
standings and expectations, a variant of Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin's 
relational view of the new economy. This shared experience is rein- 
forced, at least in some cases, by supplier associations capable of facilitat- 
ing the imposition of reputational sanctions on powerful customers who 
neglect the obligations of reciprocity. But Holmström and Roberts also 
observe that within these long-term relations the auto companies "care- 
fully monitor supplier behavior - including cost reduction, quality levels 
and improvements, general cooperativeness, and so on."179 Thus, long- 
term relations of the Japanese kind are (along with vertical integration 
and contract) one of several possible responses to hold-up problems, and 
organizational structure can comprehend all these responses, as well as 
address other incentive or governance issues such as agency problems 
and the management of information flows. 
Holmström and Roberts do not discuss the general relation of firms 
to markets in light of the many-to-many mapping they find between con- 
temporary governance tasks and instruments. But it is clear that the orig- 
inal dichotomy of hierarchy and contract cannot survive the proliferation 
of cases and relations they report. For one thing, there are no govern- 
ance tasks done only by firms or only by the market. Vertically integrated 
firms compete with firms that secure inputs or distribution by contracting 
with independent suppliers or distributors. For another, there are entire 
classes of governance mechanisms that simply cannot be usefully catego- 
rized as either hierarchy or contract. Information flows in both firms and 
markets are often managed neither by hierarchy nor contract, but rather 
by federated structures or peer-to-peer networks, such as supplier clubs or 
benchmarking groups. Seen in this light, the essence or nature of the 
firm is not to solve this or that governance problem. The firm does not in 
this sense have an essence or nature: It bundles governance instruments 
as the calculus of advantage in particular contexts suggests, and retains 
that form as a result of path dependency even as changed circumstances 
cause new competitors to adopt different arrangements. 
177. See Holmström & Roberts, supra note 9, at 81. Note that this formulation of 
Japanese contracting almost exactly parallels Williamson's description of contracting in a 
world where the parties will not behave opportunistically: "A general clause, to which both 
parties would agree, to the effect hat 'I will behave responsibly rather than seek individual 
advantage when an occasion to adapt arises,' would, in the absence of opportunism, 
suffice." Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics, supra note 1, at 241. 
178. Holmström & Roberts, supra note 9, at 81. 
179. Id. at 82. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 18 Dec 2015 17:45:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2009] CONTRACTING FOR INNOVATION 499 
B. Contracting for Innovation and the Boundaries of the Firm 
Our findings corroborate, help complete, and prompt extension of 
those of Holmström and Roberts. First, contracting for innovation can 
be thought of as a further development of the many-to-many relation of 
governance instruments o tasks. Instead of matching several instruments 
to several problems, and vice versa, contracting for innovation creates a 
single, novel regime that fuses and transforms elements of contract, bilat- 
eral governance, and hierarchical management. It uses this regime to 
coordinate investment, resolve agency problems, and direct information 
flows in a context in which the skills necessary for product development 
cannot be cabined within a single firm. The key innovation is creating a 
regime in which the regular and reciprocal provision of information 
about each party's capacity and willingness to cooperate teaches the par- 
ties how to collaborate more effectively, binding them more tightly to 
imprecisely defined common projects through increased switching costs 
resulting from that process - or alerting them to possible breakdowns 
before the costs of failure in the relation become ruinous. The "short 
and remarkably imprecise"180 contracts of the Japanese style, when 
braided with a governance process that supports mutual learning, be- 
come a regime that generates quite precise expectations and obligations. 
The tacit knowledge of innovation, often held to require the carefully 
controlled environment of the firm, is made explicit enough to be re- 
viewed across organizational boundaries (even if it is far from being fully 
formalized) and thereby opens an entity to cutting-edge technology 
lodged in other entities. This regime is not a governance panacea or all- 
purpose tool adapted to all occasions. Rather, as we have argued, it is 
particularly suited to situations where parties with distinctly different but 
complementary capacities jointly undertake to explore, and possibly ex- 
ploit, an uncertain domain, a description that predicts the prevalence of 
this organizational form in settings where innovation is central to success. 
In speaking of contracting for innovation as a further development 
of many-to-many governance, we are looking backward and forward in 
debates about governance, and in the evolution of governance instru- 
ments themselves. First, looking backward, we mean to raise the possibil- 
ity that the complex governance arrangements Holmström and Roberts 
observed a decade ago were a precursor to (or at least inspiration for) 
contracting for innovation. In particular, Japanese subcontracting and 
production methods were widespread and prominently discussed in two 
industries - automobiles and electronics - in the years before contracting 
for innovation emerged in both.181 It seems quite possible, therefore, 
180. Id. at 81. 
181. See Jeffrey H. Dyer, Collaborative Advantage: Winning Through Extended 
Enterprise Supplier Networks 169-70 (2000) (advocating "extended enterprise" strategy of 
creating value from teaming up with other companies in automobile industry) ; Toshihiro 
Nishiguchi, Strategic Industrial Sourcing: The Japanese Advantage 6 (1994) ("One 
important reason for the competitiveness of Japanese producers is the nature of Japanese 
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that firms in these industries experimented with ways to achieve 
"Japanese" collaboration without relying on features of Japanese culture 
(high trust) or institutional experience (supplier clubs) or Japanese-style 
corporate governance not easily transferable to their settings.182 Along 
the way, they would have stumbled upon the information exchange and 
governance methods reported here, and, having learned of the advan- 
tages of these methods in practice, they would, sooner or later, have 
asked a lawyer to capture their defining features in contracts with poten- 
tial partners.183 Japanese subcontracting would thus have evolved into 
contracting for innovation. Of course, this just-so story must be verified, 
or replaced by a more accurate account, and in either case there remains 
the problem of identifying the way in which contracting for innovation 
arose in the pharmaceutical industry where, to our knowledge, the 
Japanese production model was unlikely to have been immediately influ- 
ential. But contracting for innovation came from somewhere, and this 
seems a plausible hypothesis.184 
Looking forward, a second and more fundamental point raised by 
the emergence of contracting for innovation is that governance instru- 
ments have evolved - and almost surely will continue to do so. Coase's 
original contribution, though deeply informed by knowledge of the pre- 
cise practices of his day, was intended as a contribution to a noncontex- 
tual economic theory. Its aim was "to discover why a firm emerges at all 
subcontracting, which emphasizes synergistic problem solving, rather than antagonistic 
bargaining, between organizations."). 
182. For example, early in the comparative corporate governance debate, Masahiko 
Aoki argued that Japanese-style corporate governance was a critical component of 
Japanese-style manufacturing. See Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the 
Japanese Firm, 28 J. Econ. Lit. 1 (1990). In fact, other forms of corporate governance 
proved far more flexible than Aoki expected, allowing Japanese manufacturing techniques 
to be widely replicated in countries whose corporate governance regimes were dramatically 
different from Japan's and from each other's. See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate 
Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 329, 332 (2001); 
Charles Sabel, Ungoverned Production: An American View of the Novel Universalism of 
Japanese Production Methods, in Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance 
310, 311-12 (Jeffrey N. Gordon 8c MarkJ. Roe eds., 2004). 
183. For a case study of the repeated emendation of a contract between a software 
producer and a customer to reflect he lessons of their on-going relation, see Kyle J. Mayer 
& Nicholas S. Argyres, Learning to Contract: Evidence from the Personal Computer 
Industry, 15 Org. Sci. 394 (2004). 
184. As we have seen, the contract between Fisher Body and General Motors might be 
considered a more remote ancestor of contracting for innovation. It provided that Fisher 
Body would employ "the most modern, efficient and economical methods, machinery and 
devices consistent with good workmanship." Coase, Conduct of Economics, supra note 17, 
at 266. Without he information exchange mechanism of contracting for innovation, such 
a term could seem placatory. With this mechanism, the term could provide an important 
and reliable discipline on a partnership even if, like the Deere-Stanadyne relationship, it 
was a creature of an unenforceable contract. Cf. id. at 265-66 (suggesting that close 
relationship between Fisher Body and GM made deviation from efficiency requirement 
highly unlikely). 
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in a specialized exchange economy."185 Transaction-cost economics, in 
effect, takes as the field of analysis the era of (then) modern manufactur- 
ing: For that reason the Fisher Body story of 1926 is presumed relevant o 
the world of a half century later. To illustrate the limits of current ex- 
planatory schemes, Holmström and Roberts introduce a form of govern- 
ance - Japanese subcontracting - that happens to be new. But the nov- 
elty of Japanese governance, and the continuing evolution of instruments 
revealed by the diffusion of contracting for innovation, is theoretically 
significant in itself. It strongly suggests that the list of governance instru- 
ments is open-ended. Or, looking backward and forward, we can say that 
firms and governance forms co-evolve, with adjustments to new contexts 
by the firms leading to innovations in governance - which in turn change 
the context to which firms adjust. On this view, of course, firms do not 
have essences. More exactly, the firm in every epoch takes the shape nec- 
essary for the most pressing of the prevailing overnance problems: risk 
in the last century, uncertainty at the start of this one. 
There follows a final observation and qualification regarding these 
changes in firm organization and governance instrument. In reporting 
on the emergence of a novel governance instrument that supports new 
forms of cooperation, we underscore the continuing importance of 
(changes in) context not to suggest that the history of industrial organiza- 
tion has or can come to an end. The firm, now as before, has a future, 
and that future will be different from its past. For example, there are 
countertendencies ven amidst the general, current tendency to vertical 
disintegration; some are likely to remain marginal exceptions, others, 
perhaps presaging new developments, are reversions to apparently super- 
seded forms. Thus, as cell phones become on the one hand fashion 
items and on the other mobile Internet portals, Nokia, a leading pro- 
ducer, is both (re-) integrating into manufacturing - to cut the time to 
market for its fashion-sensitive products - and opening its research opera- 
tions to a wide range of collaborators - to scan for the innovations 
needed to compete in the market for mobile portals.186 Even as U.S. 
steel firms were divesting their holdings of iron ore, Mittal (now 
ArcelorMittal), a multinational offshoot of an Indian steel maker, was 
buying ore reserves to protect itself against the possibility of worldwide 
limits to supply.187 It would be a surprise, given the transformations of
recent decades, if this shifting of firm boundaries did not produce fur- 
ther innovations in governance. Contracting for innovation is a new tool. 
The best way to understand why it was made, and what it is good for, is to 
look carefully at the problems it does solve - and the ones it does not. 
185. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 163, at 390. 
186. See Yves Doz & Mikko Kosonen, The Dynamics of Strategic Agility: Nokia's 
Rollercoaster Experience, Cal. Mgmt. Rev., Spring 2008, at 95, 98-108. 
187. Pankaj Ghemawat & Ravi Madhavan, Mittal Steel in 2005: Changing the Global 
Steel Game 11-12 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Case, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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Conclusion 
In this Article, we have offered a hypothesis concerning how entities 
contract for innovation across organizational boundaries as an alternative 
to vertical integration, and also sought to place the contracting for inno- 
vation phenomenon in a more textured account of a theory of the firm 
and of contract theory. The need for the elaboration of theory was 
demonstrated by the practices that actually have developed in industries 
driven by innovation, where the exigencies of doing business pushed 
practice ahead of theory. Our analysis was illustrated and given plausibil- 
ity by three exemplars of how the practices of participants contracting for 
innovation illustrate the gaps in both of these areas of theory. The next 
step is to move from plausibility to proof, which will require both qualita- 
tive and quantitative data on parties' efforts to contract for innovation 
sufficient to give confidence that our account captures current practice, 
or to instruct us in what we have missed. That will be our next project. 
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